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This thesis focuses on relations between territorial issues and peace in the European Arctic. 
The objective of this research is to examine region‘s political decision makers‘ views and 
reflections on state of peace in the European Arctic and how it is influenced by territorial 
disputes. It utilizes a conceptual framework based on theory of zones of peace. The results of 
qualitative research indicate that territorial factor is no longer a serious threat for peace in 
contemporary European Arctic. Moreover, it finds that states in the region prioritize 
international cooperation to their geopolitical ambitions, as its‘ benefits surpass possible 
consequences of confrontation for territories. The study results emphasize the role 
international institutions in the study area both for international and cross border cooperation 
and peace. The findings also suggest that European Arctic can be described as zone of stable 
peace with certain expectations for evolving into pluralistic security community of states. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In the conditions of rising interest to the Arctic space and regions of the European North, the 
description and the analysis of geopolitical processes occurring there becomes extremely 
important from the scientific point of view. The subject is very extensive and represents itself 
a wide field for scientific activity. 
  
As Arctic region and its treasures are now getting more and more attention from the leading 
world powers, issues of peace and stability in the area become of greater concern. Enormous 
resource potential of the Arctic as well as its geopolitical and transportation perceptiveness 
stimulates global powers to join the race for ensuring their national interests in the area. 
 
Territory is one of the key factors determining international relations in the Arctic. However, 
territorial disputes in the region are quite different from the ones social researchers are used 
to. Territorial claims in the Arctic are usually concerning sea-territories rather than land-
territories
1
, which makes this region rather specific and complicated. As long as territorial 
issues in the region are of great concern, they are one of the elements which are most likely to 
influence the processes connected with peace and stability. 
 
1.1 Arctic region: problem of definition 
The Arctic region cannot be simply defined. Relevant criteria for the delimitation of the 





The official definition on what is Arctic or where its boundaries lie does not exist. Instead, 
there are few ways of defining the Arctic.   
 
The Arctic consists of ocean surrounded by continental land masses and islands. The central 
Arctic Ocean is ice-covered year-round, and snow and ice are present on land for most of the 
year.   
 
                                                     
1 Territorial issues in the region will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 
2
 Wegge N. The political order in the Arctic: power structures, regimes and influence. In: Polar record 47(241) 
(2010) p. 165. http://byers.typepad.com/files/wegge-on-ir-theory-and-arctic-1.pdf [Visited 8 October 2012] 
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The southern limit of the Arctic region is commonly placed at the Arctic Circle (latitude 66 
degrees, 32 minutes North). The Arctic Circle is an imaginary line that marks the latitude 
above which the sun does not set on the day of the summer solstice (usually 21 June) and does 




According to Rosemary Rayfuse (2007: 197) the Arctic is usually referred to as comprising 
all areas lying north of the Arctic Circle, or 66
o
33‘ north latitude. Ecologically speaking, a 
more accurate defining criterion for the Arctic region may be the northern limit of the tree 
line, the existence of which is based on temperature. Alternately, the Arctic is also sometimes 
defined as a northern region where the average July temperature is under 10
o
C. Both of these 
ecological descriptions encompass an area considerably larger than that enveloped by the 
Arctic Circle. For political purposes, too, the definition of the Arctic varies depending on the 
subject matter under discussion and on the interests of the discussants. Definitions include all 
areas north of 60
o
 north, or all areas north of the Arctic Circle but with an exception to include 




However, this scope of definitions does not fully describe the region of interest in relation to 
this research paper. As long as it is quite hard to give a full overview of peace related issues in 
the whole Arctic region, the scope of research limits the geographical boundaries to the 
Europian part of the Arctic. Due to this, a definition by Geir Hønneland (2003: 141) will be 
taken as a basis. It describes European Arctic as ―the parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
European Russia that are located north of the Arctic Circle, plus the Barents Sea, the Svalbard 
Archipelago and the Russian archipelagos of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land".
5
 At the 
same time for some purposes, it may also be fruitful to include the western and northern parts 
of the European Arctic, including the European part of the Arctic Ocean as well as Iceland 
(located south of the Arctic Circle) and Greenland (located on the North American continent) 
can also be included as ―borderline cases‖. 
 
1.2 European Arctic: factors and issues that make the region special 
Defining some characteristic features of the European Arctic is useful for its further analysis 
in terms of ―peacefulness‖ of the region. According to Åtland (2007: 8), European Arctic 
                                                     
3
 Definitions of the Arctic http://portlets.arcticportal.org/definitions-of-the-arctic  [Visited 10 October 2012] 
4
 Rayfuse, Rosemary. 2007. 'Melting Moments: The Future Of Polar Oceans Governance In A Warming World'. 
Review Of European Community & International Environmental Law 16 (2), p. 197. 
5
 Hønneland, Geir. 2003. Russia And The West. 1st ed. London: Routledge, p. 141   
3 
 
shares basic five characteristic features. It is a region: 1) of peripheries; 2) rich in natural 
resources; 3) with unresolved legal issues; 4) of strategic significance; 5) of transnational 
cooperation. 
 
Speaking about European Arctic as a region of peripheries, first thing that needs to be said is 
that ―it cuts through the borders of four states: Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Rather 
than being a region of states, it is a transnational region consisting of sub-state entities 
(Nordic counties and Russian Federation subjects) whose main common denominator is that 
of being located in the northern periphery of the European continent‖
6
. However, these are 
states, but not sub-state entities which run their international politics in the area. Thus, 
conducting international politics and promoting their national interests through their particular 
northern territories, European Arctic countries make the region a very special area from 
international relations point of view. 
 
Secondly, the region is rich in natural resources, both hydrocarbons and marine resources. 
An overview of the global oil resources by the US Geological Survey suggests that the 
circumpolar Arctic could conceal as much as 25 percent of the world‘s total remaining 
petroleum resources. As far as Norway is concerned, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
has calculated that the northern-most part of Norway‘s continental shelf might hold a third of 
the country‘s undiscovered oil and gas resources. Both Russia and Norway have signaled a 
desire to intensify offshore exploration in the European Arctic. Among the areas specified for 
such expansion are north-western Russia and the continental shelf in the Barents and Kara 
Seas. The region‘s living marine resources are also seen as being of great value, not only to 




Further Åtland stresses the existence of legal problems as another characteristic feature of the 
area. This relates to recent Russian-Norwegian issue of delimitation of continental shelves and 
economic zones in the Barents Sea which emerges from different interpretations of the legal 
basis of the delimitation and has been affecting relations between two countries over the past 
30 years. This issue, however, has been successfully solved and is no longer of great concern 
in the region. This also comes to the issue of Svalbard and Norwegian sovereignty over the 
                                                     
6
 Åtland, K. (2007) ―The European Arctic after the Cold War: how can we analyze it in terms of security?‖ 
Rapport for Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2 February 2007 p. 9 
7
 ibid. p.9 
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island, as well as fisheries protection zone around it.  
 
The fourth remarkable feature of the European Arctic is its strategic significance: 
 
“For Russia, the strategic importance of the European Arctic has historically been related to the 
Northern Fleet’s bases and port facilities on the Kola Peninsula. The concentration of sea-, land- and 
air defense forces in the northwestern corner of the Soviet Union during the Cold War was not 
primarily related to military or other threats in the region itself. Security challenges in the country’s 
southern and eastern regions have traditionally been far greater than challenges in the north and 
west. The historical reason why one of the world’s largest fleets was based on the remote Kola 
Peninsula was rather the favorable ice conditions in the southern Barents Sea, the easy access to the 
Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and the geographical proximity to potential targets on other continents. 





And finally, after the end of Cold War, European Arctic is more and more becoming an area 
of transnational and regional cooperation. In the last 10-15 years, the Arctic has become the 
focal point for a wide range of initiatives involving transnational cooperation. Some, like the 
creation of the Arctic Council in 1996, involve straightforward intergovernmental agreements, 
while others feature leagues of subnational actors drawn together in pursuit of common 
interests. The establishment of the Barents Euro-Arctic Regional cooperation in 1993 was a 
significant development that opened a new phase of East–West interaction in the region. The 
Barents Council serves as an important meeting place for representatives of Norway, Russia, 
Finland, Sweden, and the European Union. It has contributed to promoting cooperation and 
stability in one of the world‘s most heavily militarized regions. 
 
These characteristics make region special in economical, strategic, political and international 
respect. They have become a reason for European Arctic nowadays to become a matter of 
serious international concern. They have stimulated interests of the leading world powers 
moving towards the North. However, in current research I would mainly focus on three main 
characteristics. First is presence of unresolved legal issues as it is forming the context of 
territorial disputes in the European Arctic. In relation to this, transnational cooperation will be 
discussed as an alternative to territorial confrontation. And finally, issues of territory and 
cooperation will be examined through the prism of periphery, emphasizing the transnational 
nature of the European Arctic, thus bringing regional perspective to the surface. Two other 
characteristics (regions strategic significance and its resource potential), however, will not be 
left behind and will be taken into consideration as they define the specifics of political and 
geopolitical processes happening in the region and shaping international relations there. 
                                                     
8




1.3 Problem statement 
The study seeks to bring focus on the perspectives of perceptions of territory in relation peace 
at the European Arctic and on viewpoints of the politicians currently involved into the Arctic 
issues at the region. In this way referring to politicians‘ reflections hopes to create better and 
fuller understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. The study‘s standpoint is that, in order to 
understand the state of peace in the European Arctic, it is necessary to clarify the opinions 
upon the issue at the individual local politicians‘ level through obtaining first-hand 
knowledge. The study seeks to achieve this by giving priority to 1st person accounts by 
vocalizing the actors which previously mostly remained silent.  
 
By finding regional actors representing countries, who are involved into both territorial issues 
and trans-border cooperation, research seeks to vocalize perspectives of persons who cannot 
directly influence the national politics in these areas, but are, however, involved into them and 
find them as a matter of concern.   
 
Moreover, research seeks to provide insights on the processes of transformation of peace in 
the European Arctic in relation to both territory and other factors throughout the history. This 
transformation process is strongly connected to transition from the Soviet Union to Russian 
Federation. Thus, the time period chosen for the research has been chosen to be from the 
break of Soviet Union and active start of regional Arctic cooperation in 1993 until nowadays. 
However, study seeks to find the other factors that happened to influence these processes. 
Furthermore, through personal and individual-level reflections, this study seeks to be a tool 
for wider understanding of processes of change and continuity in contemporary European 
Arctic. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
According to this context, the main question this thesis aims to answer is: What is the state of 
peace in today‘s European Arctic? 
 




 What kind of ―zone of peace‖9 is the European Arctic? 
 What are the local politicians‘ views upon peace in the area? 
 What is the role of territory in relation to peace in the area? 
 How other processes, such as international and cross-border cooperation influence 
peace in the European Arctic? 
 
1.5 Finding my thesis 
 




The starting point of this thesis project was simple curiosity. In the year of 2008 I was a third 
year student in Russia studying International Relations. I got an assignment of writing a term 
paper titled ―Arctic Geopolitics in global context‖. While reading the literature about the 
issue, talking to the scientists, involved into the Arctic research, and discussing the case with 
my fellow students, I became more and more curious about the subject. Apparently, for me 
the assignment happened to become not just another boring term paper, but a subject of 
scientific interest. Since I have always been interested in geopolitics, I found it extremely 
exciting to research on the geopolitical interests of the world‘s leading countries around the 
strategically and economically important area. So, after submitting the term paper 
successfully, I decided that I might be interested in writing my final graduation diploma paper 
on the same topic. 
 
Another factor which made Arctic a field of my research area was actually my Northern 
mentality. I am coming from Arkhangelsk – a city on the North-West of Russia which has 
deep historical connection with the Arctic. So the Arctic issues have always been of 
significant importance in my city. Arctic has always been considered as one of the most 
perspective directions for the city development and this caused my interest in researching the 
role of the Arkhangelsk region in the global context of the Arctic geopolitical processes. 
Arkhangelsk ambitions of becoming the gateway to the Russian Arctic were of great concern 
for me as for a city inhabitant.  
 
                                                     
9
 Concept of ―zones of peace‖ will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
10 Dyadya Zhenya – Russian Hip-Hop singer 
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At the same time, coming from the North was an obvious interest determining my interest in 
Northern issues. Conducting a research which is relevant for my home area seemed to me to 
be both challenging and valuable at the same time. It is also important for my self-satisfaction, 
as it is giving me a feeling that I am doing something which is good and useful for my home. 
Being an International Relations student determined my interests in the Northern issues 
moving to the international arena. Obviously it made me curious about the international 
processes happening in the area, thus making me enthusiastic about the further research on the 
topic. Studying International Relations encouraged me to research not only about the Russian 
politics in the area, but to study the positions of the other actors represented in the region as 
well. While investigating on the other countries politics, I was comparing them to the Russian 
ones, trying to identify the similarities and differences, weak and strong points in countries 
positions, thus diving deeper into the Arctic geopolitical issues. That was the beginning of my 
thesis. 
 
In the first place, my plan was to write about territorial impact on peace in the Arctic from the 
Geopolitical point of view. However, being a peace student I started to have an impression 
that Geopolitical perspective does not seem to be absolutely relevant for the perspective of my 
research. I planned to make my research from peaceful perspective, examining peace in the 
region and factors which affect or influence it. Geopolitical concepts, however, failed to 
provide full and profound understanding of peace in the Arctic, tenting to describe the nature 
of conflict rather than peace in the area, thus affecting the peaceful perspective of my 
research. Aimed at describing national supremacy and strategic struggle, Geopolitical 
concepts, in my view, not only fail to contribute to the peaceful regional research, but also 
affect the peaceful nature of my research. 
 
And secondly, after my fieldwork in Russia in 2012 I started to feel that my preliminary 
choice of theory was drawing attention away from what my informants were actually saying. 
Instead of geopolitical issues the interviewees were talking about the local, regional and 
cross-border processes, thus leaving geopolitics behind. So original approach did not seem to 
resonate with the reflections and experiences the interviewees had shared with me, thus 
making geopolitical concepts irrelevant for this research perspective. 
 
Thus I came to idea that a new theoretical concept was needed. After some research I came to 
a conclusion that the concept of ―Zones of peace‖ by Kakowicz happened to be the most 
8 
 
relevant concept for the perspective of my research.
11
 After trying to implement it to the 
existing Arctic realities, I got an impression that it opens new horizons and opportunities for 
the Arctic peace research. 
 
Thus the research perspective and framework was set, making me confident about the future 
research and giving an opportunity of finding my thesis. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. In the next chapter the context of the study is further 
detailed with focus on the history of the territorial issues in the European Arctic. Chapter 3 
presents the conceptual framework of the thesis. Chapter 4 discusses and reflects on the 
methodological issues of the study. Chapter 5 focuses on informant presentation, data 




                                                     
11
 The concept of ―zones of peace‖ and its relevance to my research will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2. European Arctic in Geopolitical Context 
In this Chapter geopolitical processes taking place in the target region will be discussed. This 
relates both to territorial issues and processes of Arctic cooperation, since they simultaneously 
form geopolitics in the area.  
 
2.1 Arctic territorial disputes over borders and jurisdiction 
 
“As a result of these developments, the Arctic is emerging as a region of major geopolitical 
significance to the five Arctic coastal states – Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and 
Norway – as well as to other Arctic and non-Arctic states. Previously non-pressing disputes over 
access to natural resources and strategic shipping lanes are gradually coming to the surface, raising 
concerns about a possible “remilitarization” of the region”.
12 
 
Kristian Åtland (2010) defines 8 basic territorial disputes and disagreements that are most 
likely to rise the conflict potential in the Arctic, thus affecting the state of peace in the area. 
They are: ―(1) the delimitation of Norway‘s and Russia‘s economic zones and continental 
shelves in the Barents Sea, (2) the legal status of the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and 
the shelf area around Svalbard (Norway and Russia, primarily), (3) the delimitation of the 
Bering Sea (U.S. and Russia), (4) the delimitation of Beaufort Sea (U.S. and Canada), (5) the 
disputed status of Hans Island in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and Greenland 
(Canada and Denmark), (6) the legal status of the Northwest Passage (Canada and the U.S.), 
(7) the legal status of the Northern Sea Route (Russia and the U.S., primarily), and (8) the 





As European Arctic is the primary region of current research, issues numbered (4) and (6) are 
of less interest as the territories which constitute the subject of concern in these disputes, 
happen to be outside the geographical area of research. Disagreements numbered (3), (5), and 
(7) can be described as issues of medium concern in relation to current research as they 
involve at least one actor state from the European Arctic. While territorial issues number (1), 
(2) and (7) happen to be of greatest concern and the most sensitive ones when it comes to state 
of peace in the targeted region of research and how it is influenced by territorial factor. This is 
                                                     
12
 Åtland K. 2010. Security implications of climate change in the Arctic. The Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI), p. 3 
13
 ibid. p. 19 
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simply because these disagreements directly involve countries from the European Arctic, thus 
making them most valuable for current research. However, territorial disputes that have been 
defined of less importance should never be left behind or underestimated as they happen to be 
a part of the bigger picture of territorial disagreements in the Arctic which constitutes the 
context for the current research. 
 
This is why every territorial disagreement will be described in the following parts of the 
paragraph to an extent they are valuable for European Arctic as the target region of current 
research. 
 
2.1.1 Russia – Norway’s dispute upon delimitation in the Barents Sea 
The history of the delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea dates back at least to the 1957 
Varangerfjord Agreement, which established the boundary between the territorial seas of 
mainland Norway and the Soviet Union. Since this time the issue was gradually developing 
along with the development of international law of the sea. After UN Convention on the 
Continental Shelf was adopted both Norway (in 1963) and Soviet Union (in 1967) claimed 
sovereign rights to the seabed and the subsoil adjacent to its coasts.
14
 Norway has argued that 
the boundary should follow the ―median line‖, whereas Russia has claimed the so-called 
―sector line‖, as did the Soviet Union.
15
 The discrepancy between the two claims gave a 
disputed area (see Figure 2.1) of some 155,000 square kilometers, or roughly 11 % of the 
Barents Sea, including shelf areas containing potentially significant petroleum resources.  
 
                                                     
14
 Henriksen, Tore, and Geir Ulfstein. 2011. 'Maritime Delimitation In The Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty'. 
Ocean Development & International Law 42 (1-2), p. 2 
15




Figure 2.1. The Norwegian-Russian delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea. The 




Thus the formal agreement on border delimitation between two countries was needed and 
negotiations started in 1974. They were expedited by the fact that in 1977 both countries 
established their 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ‘s) in the Barents Sea. Thus, 
besides delimitation of the boundary, both states needed to deal with overlapping EEZ claims. 
This stimulated the negotiation process, because EEZ waters were very valuable for both 
countries in terms of fishing, which pushed parties to the first agreement: 
 
“Because fishing was the most pressing issue, they agreed on a temporary arrangement to regulate 
fishing in the disputed area, the so-called Grey Zone Agreement, which was signed in January 
1978.12 The Grey Zone Agreement covered a large part of the southern area of the disputed waters as 
well as including undisputed Norwegian and Soviet EEZs.13 Under the agreement, each party was to 
                                                     
16
 Åtland K. 2010. Security implications of climate change in the Arctic. The Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI) p. 19 
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exercise jurisdiction solely over fishing vessels flying its own flag and over vessels flying the flag of 





Later negotiations on the continental shelf continued on the basis of Article 6 of the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention to which both states were parties, which stipulated that the 
boundary is the median line unless another boundary is justified by ―special circumstances.‖
18
 
However, at this point both parties had serious disagreements:  
 
“Norway’s position was that there were no special circumstances in the overlapping claimed area 
and that the boundary should be the median line between the mainland coasts and of Svalbard and the 
islands of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Island.17 The Soviet Union (and its successor the Russian 
Federation) has maintained that there are special circumstances and that the maritime boundary 
should follow the so-called sector line from the Varangerfjord toward the North Pole only adjusted 





The other special circumstances argued by USSR included the greater population, geological 
conditions, economic interests, special environmental risks, and security interests. 
 
Henriksen and Ulfstein (2011: 2) state that ―over the years there was seemingly slow, if any, 
progress in the negotiations. A proposal in 1988 by the Soviet Union for cooperation on 
petroleum resources in a joint development zone was rejected by Norway. Progress was made 
in 2007 when the parties agreed to revise the 1957 Varangerfjord Agreement to extend the 
maritime boundary to a point approximately 30 kilometers from the terminus of the 
Varangerfjord, where the median line and sector line cross and the southern part of the 
disputed area began.‖ Finally, after 40 years of negotiation, in 2010 parties managed to reach 
the agreement. The agreed-upon delimitation line, known as ―the compromise line‖ was 
established. It divides the overall disputed area in ―two parts of approximately the same size‖, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.2 
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 Henriksen, Tore, and Geir Ulfstein. 2011. 'Maritime Delimitation In The Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty'. 
Ocean Development & International Law 42 (1-2), p. 2 
18
 UN Convention on the Continental Shelf, article 6 
19
 Henriksen, Tore, and Geir Ulfstein. 2011. 'Maritime Delimitation In The Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty'. 









Thus, the issue is now officially solved; however, the past tensions are still likely to 
influence the relations between two countries. Since the Barents Sea delimitation has been a 
big problem for Russia and Norway, one should keep it in mind when analyzing peace in the 
European Arctic simply because it serves an example of territorial dispute on one hand and 
dialogue and cooperation on the other.  
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 Afterposten (12.10.2011) Her går delelinjen 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article3625442.ece#.U3TUcygkR2A [Visited 21 November 2012] 
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2.1.2 Legal status of the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area 
around Svalbard 
 
In addition to the delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea, Norway and Russia have differing 
interpretations of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. 
 
―During the peace settlement in the aftermath of World War I, Norway‘s main aim was to 
obtain sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago‖
21
. After ensuring support from the greatest 
powers who won the WWI, Norway reached the goal, and in 1920 Norway signed the 
Svalbard Treaty, proclaiming Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago. Russia, was, 
however, absent at the peace conference in Paris, but protested against the Svalbard Treaty.
22
 
However, in 1924 USSR joined the treaty for the purpose of conducting economic activities 
on the island. 
 
Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty grants Norway ―full and absolute sovereignty‖ over Svalbard, 
but at the same time, under articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, the nationals of all  parties to the 
Treaty ‗enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting‘ and may engage in ‗all  maritime, 
industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality‘
23
. However as 
noted by Pedersen, ―the Svalbard Treaty, crafted prior to the modern law of the sea, is 
inconclusive as to which maritime areas its stipulations apply, referring only to the ―waters 
[…] of the territories,‖ a dimness that has given rise to international controversy.‖
24
 
Norwegian regulatory measures on and around Svalbard have often been perceived in Russia 
as infringements on the latter articles: 
 
As far as the maritime areas around Svalbard are concerned, Norway maintains that the Svalbard 
Treaty’s provisions apply only to the land and sea territory of the archipelago. Russia (and other 
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 Riste, O. 2003. Norway’s Foreign Relations: A History. / Russian translation by Korobochkina M. Moscow: 
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Pedersen (2010: 237) states that major concerns about Norwegian sovereign rights today 
primarily relate to the continental shelf and the 200-mile zone adjacent to Svalbard, Norway's 
jurisdiction on Svalbard territory has also been challenged.  
 
A climax was reached in 1944 when the Soviet foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, suggested that 
the Svalbard Treaty should be “thrown in the trashcan,” that sovereignty over the southernmost Bear 





Further international tensions, according to Pedersen, also rose in 1951 when Norway 
included the archipelago in the NATO command system. The reaction of the Soviet Union 
was sending a note to Norway, calling this act ―unfriendly‖, stating that the Soviet State was 
―unable to recognize as legal‖; later followed by the incident in the late 1950s when Norway 
sought to establish an airfield on Svalbard amid Soviet protests (ibid.). 
 
In 1976–77 Norway added to its position an obligation to manage the living resources off 
Svalbard. It established the 200-mile fisheries protection zone by Royal Decree on 3 June 
1977, a provisional measure to ―preserve the living resources in the sea.‖ (ibid.) Even though 
the Svalbard Treaty, as noted by Pedersen (2010: 237)  did apply beyond the territorial limits, 
Norway argued, Article 2 of the Treaty prescribed it to ―maintain, take or decree suitable 
measures to ensure the preservation and, if necessary, the re-constitution of the fauna and 
flora‖ in Svalbard waters. Soviet Union, therefore, called this decision unfair and illegal: 
 
“...the Norwegian decision assumes the opportunity to prohibit other contracting parties from 
conducting fishing in this area and even presupposes punitive measures against their nationals. … 
The Soviet government views the decision taken 3 June 1977 as a new step by Norway toward the 
illegal expansion of Norwegian rights in the Spitsbergen area, in defiance of the articles in the Treaty 




Thus the situation resulted into a long-running dispute, primarily between Norway and the 




A Barents Sea treaty might seem to be a solution for the ongoing dispute between two 
countries, but, unfortunately, ―neither the joint statement nor the treaty include references to 
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the Svalbard archipelago or any of its islands.‖
29
 Never the less, some researchers (Henriksen, 
Ulfstein 2011: 9) claim that by drawing the delimitation line east of its previously asserted 
adjusted sector Russia can be read as recognizing that current Norwegian policies over 
Svalbard are not breaking the treaty of 1920. Anyhow, since the official change of Russian 
position has never been announced, such statements should be treated critically and not taken 
for granted, since recent arrests of Russian fisheries vessels by Norwegian coast-guard, even 
after the Barents Sea treaty was ratified,
30
 illustrate, that Russia is still not recognizing the 
200-mile fisheries protection zone. 
 
So, to a certain extent, the dispute still exists, thus being able to influence not only Russian-
Norwegian relations in the European Arctic, but peace and stability in the region as a whole. 
This issue, without any doubt, should be kept in mind when analyzing the state of peace in the 
region. 
 
2.1.3 Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
Article 76 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) permits a coastal 
state whose continental margin extends beyond its 200-nautical-mile EEZ to establish the 
outer edge of its continental margin up to, but no further than, 350 nautical miles beyond the 
baselines used to delimit the territorial sea or not more than 100 nautical miles (n.m.) from the 
2,500-meter isobath. Specifically, the coastal State intending to claim a continental shelf 
beyond 200 n.m. is required to submit information (a certain number of geological and other 
data) on the limits of the shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(hereafter CLCS or the Commission). Thus, according to this, a number of Arctic states have 
submitted their claims to extend their territories: 
 
“In the Arctic region, the Russian Federation made a submission on 20 December 2001. On 27 June 
2002, the Commission adopted its recommendation on the submission and recommended that the 
Russian Federation make a revised submission. On 27 November 2006, Norway submitted relevant 
information with regard to the North East Atlantic and the Arctic to the Commission. The 
recommendation on Norway’s submission was adopted by the Commission on 13 March 2009. On 29 
April 2009, Iceland submitted data concerning the Aegir Basin area and the western and southern 
parts of Reykjanes Ridge to the Commission. On the same day, Denmark submitted data with respect 
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to the area north of the Faroe Islands to the Commission. As at 2010, the recommendations of the 





Kristian Åtland (2010: 18) notes that these claims may turn out to be partially overlapping, 
particularly in the cases of Russia, Canada, and Denmark. All of the three countries argue that 
the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural continuation of their respective continental shelves.  This 
and other underwater structures are in other words likely to figure centrally in the 
deliberations. 
 




Figure 2.3 shows the possible overlap of territorial claims from Russia, Canada and Denmark 
in relation to the Lomonosov Ridge. Since CLCS process provides no mechanisms for 
resolving simultaneously submitted conflicting claims, these three countries might face a 
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As noted by Traner (2011: 508), Canada and Denmark, have been cooperating in data 
collection process, however, at the same time these states still send their own national 
scientists and maintain their own national programs. Russia does not take part in this research 
and has its own data collection team. ―Thus, even if Canada and Denmark submit a joint 




Thus, in relation to the European Arctic, process of delimitation of continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles certainly holds some conflict potential. However, it is hard to imagine an 
opened violent conflict in relation to this issue, but at the same time, an unsolved dispute 
creates a certain level of stress in the area, therefore being able to influence on state of peace, 
security and stability in the region. 
 
2.1.4. Other territorial disputes 
The scope of other territorial issues in the Arctic region, according to Åtland (2010: 21--22), 
includes: delimitation of the Bering Sea, delimitation of Beaufort Sea, disputed status of Hans 
Island in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, legal status of the 
Northwest Passage, legal status of the Northern Sea Route. 
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Figure 2.4 shows a brief overview of these disputes. Some of them might not be that crucial 
for the European Arctic, however, they form the context and background for geopolitical 
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processes in the area. While being able to affect the state of peace in the other parts of the 
Arctic, these issues, definitely, can indirectly influence stability and security in the European 
part of the region.Thus, when analyzing state of peace in European Arctic, these processes, 
happening in the Arctic as a whole, should also be taken into consideration and should never 
be left behind. Combined together with disputes in the European arctic, they constitute the 
whole picture of peace and security in the Arctic Region. 
 
However, since the European Arctic if the target region of research, the above issues will be 
paid less attention and will be addressed only as a part of contextual framework in relation to 
the target area. 
 
2.2 Changing Arctic: conflict or cooperation? 
All the above mentioned disputes constitute a certain level of tenseness in the European 
Arctic. However, the region is not only about conflict. International and cross-border 
cooperation is a big part of region‘s development and should never be left behind when 
discussing peace in the area. 
 
When it comes to the European Arctic as a target region of research, Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region (BEAR) is the key player for cooperation in the area. BEAR is the ―largest region for 
interregional cooperation, which includes the northernmost parts of Sweden, Norway, Finland 
and Northwest Russia. The Region is characterized by ―strong cultural identity, stability, 
prosperity and fast progress‖.
36
 The Barents cooperation was formally established on 11 
January 1993, when the Kirkenes declaration was signed. The Barents cooperation is 
organized on two level. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council  (BEAC) operates at government 
level and the Regional Council  operates at regional level. 
 
The purpose of the Barents Cooperation is to strengthen east-west infrastructure, establish 
people-to-people contacts and thereby contribute to the economic, cultural and social 
development of the Region. The Barents Cooperation promotes people-to-people contacts and 
economic development and creates good conditions for interregional exchange in many 
different fields; e.g., culture, indigenous peoples, youth, education, security, trade, 
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environment, transportation and health. The primary goal of BEAC is to promote sustainable 
economic and social development in the Barents Region and thus contribute to peaceful 




Since its creation, BEAR has been the key institution for international, regional and cross-
border cooperation in the European Arctic, thus influencing the state of peace in the region in 
a positive way. 
 
When it comes to Arctic as a whole, the Arctic Council is a remarkable organization for 
international cooperation in the region. Established in 1996 under Ottawa Declaration, Arctic 
Council serves as a high level forum to:  
 provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the 
Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other 
Arctic inhabitants on common arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic. 
 oversee and coordinate the programs established under the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy – international initiative preceding Arctic Council - on the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Program; conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna; 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment; and Emergency Preparedness and 
Response. 
 adopt terms of reference for and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development 
program. 





The Council consists of eight Arctic states; Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, Russia and the U.S and six permanent participants; Aleut International Association, 
Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, 
Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North and Saami Council. Since its establishment it 
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has served as an important meeting platform for the Arctic states to discuss the above 
mentioned issues and to coordinate cooperation on them. 
 
So, together with unresolved issues, European Arctic holds a certain level of well-developed 
cooperation, as well as avenues for future potential cooperation. As stated by Brosnan (2011: 
203) the criteria by which the Arctic states make their policy decisions will play a key role in 
determining whether states pursue avenues for cooperation or whether conflict will arise. 
 
2.3 Summary 
As stated by Åtland (2010: 22), despite the presence of unresolved issues, ―the Arctic is 
generally a stable and peaceful region, and the long-term conflict potential should not be 
exaggerated.‖ 
 
“There seems to be consensus among Arctic and non-Arctic nations that UNCLOS applies also to the  
Arctic Ocean, and that there is no need for a region-specific legal regime à la the Antarctic  Treaty. 
The five Arctic coastal states’ commitment to finding peaceful solutions to outstanding issues through 
diplomacy and negotiations, in accordance with the existing Law of the Sea framework, has been 
reiterated on a number of occasions, for instance in the joint declaration signed at the Arctic Ocean 




However, at the same time, Åtland warns that one should not underestimate the potential for 
interstate disputes and conflicts over the access to the land and shelf areas inside the Arctic 
Circle[23]. 
 
As can be concluded from the points, discussed above, European Arctic has a double-faced 
nature. On one hand we have a certain conflict possibility, but on the other – a history of 
ongoing international cooperation and potential for its enlargement. Thus, for a peace 
researcher, calling European Arctic merely ―generally a stable and peaceful region‖, without 
defining the condition of peace in the area is not just enough. This is why, from a scientific 
point of view, it becomes really interesting to investigate the state of peace in such a 
controversial region.  
 
In further chapters of my research, I will study how territorial issues influence peace in the 
European Arctic.  
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Chapter 3. Conceptual framework 
This chapter brings the conceptual framework to the study of territory and its influence on the 
state of peace in the European Arctic. It introduces the concept of zones of peace by 
Kacowicz as an attempt to describe relation between peace and territory in the study region. 
With this concept I seek to explain how territorial issues in the European Arctic influence the 
state of peace there. 
 
Relations between territorial claims and their influence on peace in the European Arctic have 
been clear for me since the start of research project. Reason has been simple: one can never 
speak about perfect peace in the certain area while territorial disputes still exist there. Thus, 
my desire to examine the state of peace in relation to territory as one of the most sensitive 
topics in the European Arctic has determined my choice of theory. Moreover, field findings 
have also proven that current concept was a relevant choice. As my informants always failed 
to describe European Arctic as a ―fully peaceful region‖, it became more obvious for me that 
a certain gradation of ‗peacefulness‘ is necessary. Therefore I consider current concept to be 
the most relevant in helping to provide objective answers to my research questions. 
 
3.1 Concept of zones of peace 
The world consists of regions which are made up from states. These states as a rule have 
something in common in order to be united into one region. This might be various factors 
from sharing common geographic area to culture, religion, identity, traditions, common 
history, etc. In some regions tensions between states arise and disappear with permanent 
frequency, while some of them, due to some special features, managed to secure the 
sustainable state of peace throughout the centuries. In respect to regional approach Kacowicz 
defines zone of peace as ―a discrete geographical region of the world, in which the vast 
majority of a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for at least 
thirty years (a generation), even though civil wars and domestic unrest and violence might 





In other words, first of all, the countries in the zone of peace should share some common 
geographical location thus forming a region. The geographical closeness constitutes the key 
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basement for the regional approach and makes it possible to unite countries to the zones of 
peace. 
 
Further Kacowicz notices that states should have maintained peaceful relations for at least 
thirty years. This, however, arises some questions. First of all it is necessary to identify the 
term ―peaceful relations‖. Relying on Galtung‘s concept of negative and positive peace, 
―peaceful relations‖ can only understood as an absence of open violent conflict between 
countries in the region, but this does not necessarily mean that the area is peaceful. People 
can, for example, experience a high rate of structural (indirect) violence in forms of 
exploitation, segmentation and marginalization as well as cultural violence which relates to 
―aspects of symbolic sphere of life that can be used to legitimize direct or structural 
violence‖.
41
 Secondly, it is doubtable that one generation is enough for the country to be 
regarded as peaceful: this generation might simply be the ―children of war‖ who have seen the 
horrors of violent conflict and have no willingness to experience it again. But their 
grandchildren, however might think in an opposite way, this is why, it might be reasonable to 
say that there should be a certain peaceful mentality formed throughout the generations in 
order to constitute the zone of peace. However, for modern history 30 years is a big period 
and this is why it might be reasonable to set it as a time criteria. 
 
Moreover, Kacowicz stresses that being involved into internal domestic and even broader 
international conflicts which do not directly affect the neighbors is still acceptable for the 
country in order to remain the member of the zone of peace. This statement, however, is also 
doubtable: both internal and international conflicts participation can have long-going 
consequences beginning from sanctions up to intervention and terrorism. All this measures are 
likely to affect not only the country taking part in a conflict, but the other actors in the region 
as well. This is why we can say that being  involved either in the conflict outside the zone of 
peace or into domestic civil war brings a certain threat to the region and affects the positive 
understanding of the zone of peace. 
 
Kacowicz, however, has the same doubts and this is why he does not see all the zones of 
peace to be the same, dividing them into three types in respect with Galtung‘s peace 
understanding theory. 
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At first he relates his theory to negative peace, identifying the first type of zones of peace as 
 
―… zones of negative or precarious peace (the mere absence of war), in which peace is maintained 
only tentatively by threats, deterrence, or an unwillingness or incapacity to pursue violent conflict at a 
particular time. In a region of negative peace, the vast majority of states support their territorial status 
quo. In this sub-system, civil wars, domestic and international conflicts, and even limited military 




He understands the second gradation of zones of peace as zone of stable peace which consists 
of a ―community or society of nation-states satisfied with status quo, in which domestic and 
international conflicts might occur, but remain non-violent‖
43
. In such zones ―peace occurs on 
a reciprocal, consensual basis and the probability of war is so small that it does not really 




And finally Kacowicz defines the third type of zone of peace as  
 
―… zones comprised of a pluralistic security community of nation-states, with stable expectations of 
peaceful change, in which the member states share common norms, values, and political institutions, 
sustain an identifiable common identity, and are deeply interdependent. A pluralistic security 
community results from integration, which occurs when regional states stop preparing for war against 
one another. More subjectively, integration reflects a prevalence of mutually compatible self-images 





As can be seen from the definitions, negative peace is fundamental for establishing any of the 
three kinds of zones. Speaking more precisely, territorial satisfaction and absence of territorial 
claims are essential for region to be called a zone of peace; however Kacowicz notes that ―it is 
not a necessary factor‖ – regional peace is not explained by a single factor rather than by 




The theory can also be criticized to be ―one-sided‖, focused on describing only peace in its 
different understandings. It fails to describe the nature of possible conflict which might occur 
within the zone of peace, and even more, does not attempt to describe the nature of conflicts 
which happen outside the zone but involve states from the zone. It can, however, be argued 
that if the conflict occurs within one of the three types of zone of peace, its nature lays in 
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changing the conditions of sustaining peace in the region. In relation to zones of negative 
peace this might mean one of the states being able to go into war. In respect to stable peace 
this relates to one of the parties dissatisfaction on territorial status quo and/or certain value of 
indirect violence. And in relation to pluralistic community of states it means start of 
disintegration processes and loose of common identity. At the same time with a certain level 
of interdependence and interconnection violent conflict seems to be hardly possible in this 
third kind of zone of peace. 
 
In further parts of my research I will give a brief overview of three types of zones of peace 
and will try to define European Arctic as one of them (if any). 
 
Zones of negative peace 
As stated above, zones of negative peace are mainly characterized by the absence of war. This 
principle lies in the basis of all the three types; however, in relation to zones of negative 
peace, it is extremely important to understand why states in certain regions do not clash into 
the open violent conflict with each other. Kacowicz believes that democracies ―…do not war 
with each other since they are usually satisfied with the status quo, within their own sovereign 
territories and across their borders‖.
47
 This satisfaction can take different forms depending on 
various characteristics of the countries represented, beginning from a) ―lack of revintionist 
intentions and territorial claims towards neighboring states‖; to b) satisfaction ―in relation to 
the existing regional and international orders‖ and respect to international law;  up to c) 
satisfaction because of being the dominant power of in the region.
48
 Of course different 
countries in the region have different kinds of territorial satisfaction. Satisfactions a and b 
seem to be of no danger and even contributing to the regional negative peace establishment, 
but satisfaction of type c is rather controversial and can contribute to peace establishment as 
well as can be regarded as a threat by other member states thus affecting the regional peace. 
 
The basic conditions needed for establishing the zone of negative peace are obvious and 
follow from the definition of negative peace. However, war can be present in the regions of 
negative peace; this is why it is necessary to clarify its elements. As Archer and Joenniemi 
note, the two main conditions for establishing the negative peace zone are: 1) absence or very 
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little inter-state war in the region; 2) states should not be involved into war with other actors 





The first condition is quite obvious but, however, still leaves the understanding of zone of 
negative peace quite unclear through allowing low-scale wars to appear. This however 
threatens the definition of negative peace thus deleting it away from the region; this is why it 
might be reasonable to exclude the possibility of little inter-state war inside the region from 
this condition. At the same time, the second condition and its part concerning the possibility 
of involvements into wars which were not initiated by the member-states of zone of peace 
appears to be rather reasonable relying on the natural right of the state to protect its interests. 
If the state was attacked by the other state it does not necessarily mean it is not peaceful and 
does not mean it affects peace in the region. 
 
Illustrating the zones of negative peace Western Africa is a very good example. Kacowicz 
marks that in spite of regions disputes, high rate of domestic violence and civil war…  
 
―…West Africa stands out as Africa's only zone of peace since the decolonization process began after 
World War II. Except for the brief Mali-Burkina Faso war of December 1985, and the border 
skirmishes between Dahomey and Niger in 1963-1964, and between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989-
1990, no international wars have occurred among the 16 member-states of the Economic Community 




Negative peace in this zone can be explained by the fact that most of the states in the region 
have been satisfied with the territories they obtained after the break of the colonial world 
order and that they had to concentrate on dealing with their internal security issues rather than 
on expanding their territorial assets.
51
 This internal security concerns prevented member-
states from being involved into clashing with each other as well as from the conflicts outside 
the region, thus ensuring both basic conditions for establishment of the negative peace zone. 
The other factor which contributed to the peace establishment in the region is that at least 
some of the countries (Sierra Leone and Gambia) have experience democracy while the others 
were the authoritarian regimes or were looking forward for democratic way of development.
52
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This fact proves that even though democracy is crucial for the zone of negative peace 
establishment, it ―might also emerge among strong (but undemocratic) states … but the 
quality of the peace may be influenced by the type of political regime‖.
53
 Negative peace was 
also supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which 
―managed to coordinate the regional political decisions of the West African Heads of State, 
and even helped to establish a common security policy towards the Liberian domestic crisis of 
1989-1990—which produced the unique, peace-enforcing West African multinational force 
(ECOMOG) in 1990-1995‖.
54
 This once again stresses the importance of the importance of 
local international organizations in the process of regional peace building. ECOWAS was a 
big step forward towards West-African cooperation and had a huge potential of transforming 
the already established negative peace to stable peace zone and in future perspective even 
moving towards the security community of states. 
 
However it did not and there is a number of reasons which did not let the West-African zone 
of negative peace evolve into something more favorable. First of all, this was the high rate of 
internal conflicts which were not only threatening the peace in the region but also made the 
member-states authorities fully concentrate on the internal violence rather than paying 
attention to issues of democratization, regional development and interstate cooperation. 
Secondly, that were the authorities themselves, most of them were authoritarian, greedy for 
powers and might have seen stable peace zone establishment as a threat to their unlimited 
powers and interests. And finally that was ―economic stagnation and marginalization, which 
slow the interdependence that follows from economic and political integration‖
55
. In order to 
overcome these challenges it might be reasonable for West-African states to step on the 
democratic way of development as soon as possible in order to obtain authorities which would 
be able to stop the internal conflicts and ensure regional interaction in order to move forward 
to more desirable types of zones of peace. 
 
Zones of stable peace 
Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 4) state the two important characteristics of zones of stable 
peace. First there should be no or little armed conflict in form of civil wars or other uprisings, 
and second, the countries in the region should not take part in military interventions in other 
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parts of the world.
56
 These factors are crucial for the region to be called zone of stable peace 
and contribute to further peace evolution in the area. 
 
Kacowicz describes South America as zone of stable peace: 
 
―Since the Pacific War's end in 1883, the South American region has been a zone of peace, except for 
two international wars: the 1932-1935 Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, and the 1941 border 




He states that mainly all the countries were satisfied with the territorial status quo left after the 
colonial regime break, but even when territorial disputes occurred, they were as a rule 
resolved peacefully. This satisfaction was the basis for negative peace in the area which later 
evolved to stable peace. This satisfaction is the essential condition for stable peace 
establishment and helped to avoid violent conflicts in the region. The other necessary 
condition for stable peace, as noted by Kacowicz is a normative consensus on peaceful 
change
58
 which is defined by Miall as ―mutual development, mutual trust and co-operative 
behavior‖.
59
 However, those were not only these two conditions which contributed into stable 
peace establishment in South America. The other contributing conditions can also be found. 
Such things as contentious process of democratization taking place in the region are also 
believed to contribute to negative peace evolving to stable one. This showed the desire of the 
member states to improve the existing situation and to preserve peace in the area. This might 
have brought them to closer cooperation and interaction, thus making stable peace more 
possible. This brought the region to ―economic integration, interdependence, and even 
transnational linkages that (re)create a common identity‖.
60
 This shows that stable peace 
cannot be achieved without inter-state cooperation in the region and states desire for closer 
harmonization.  
 
This is remarkable, that just like in West African case, South America have the international 
organization for cooperation – MERCOSUR – and we can say that such kinds of institutions 
are crucial for establishing regional peace, because the not only provide international 
cooperation, but also contribute to building regional identity and coordinate region‘s policies. 
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Unlike Western Africa, South American countries had less internal problems and a strong 
desire for democratization – the countries did not have to think about the internal conflicts and 
did not have to fight for the regime and this brought them to stronger regional interaction and 
dedicated peace building. These processes formed the basis for possible South American 
evolution into the region with pluralistic community of states. 
 
Pluralistic community of states 
And finally the third type of zone of peace is a ―pluralistic security community of nation-
states, with stable expectations of peaceful change, in which the member states share common 
norms, values, and political institutions, sustain an identifiable common identity, and are 
deeply interdependent‖.
61
 This is the most desirable state of the regional peace. As can be 
seen from the definition, pluralistic community is a product of regional cooperation, 
integration and interconnection. These processes, however, do not crop up by themselves; 
they are a natural result of sharing common history, culture and traditions, thus forming a 
special kind of common regional identity which then stopped countries from fighting each 
other and thus contributed to process of regional peace building. 
 
Following Archer and Joenniemi the necessary conditions for pluralistic community of states 
are: 1) full absence of any kind of violent conflict as well as its little possibility 2) political 
institutions of the member-states are closely interconnected or are even common.
62
 The first 
condition can easily be explained by long historical ties, atmosphere of respect and certain 
value of common identity, as well as by a number of factors which are of benefit for all the 
states like economic, political and other types of cooperation. While political institutions 
interconnection is a deliberate step towards new level of regional interaction which would 
benefit for all the member-states. Peaceful coexistence in such areas is natural and is taken for 
granted. Kacowicz stresses that historical overview shows that pluralistic communities 
involve only democracies
63
 and this is why democracy is desirable for regional peace building 
as well as for evolving from negative and stable peace to pluralistic community of states. 
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The pluralistic community can be illustrated with Nordic example. Countries in this region 
share common history, mentality, language propinquity as well as certain value of common 
identity. These factors formed the basis for Nordic region to become relatively peaceful 
experiencing no war since 1815.
64
 The other conditions for Nordic region to become a 
pluralistic community, as identified by Archer and Joenniemi, are: lack of ethnic and cultural 
differences, common political culture, high level of interdependence between member-states, 




These factors, supported by strong people desire for peaceful interaction contributed for 
process of Nordic states evolution into pluralistic community. Such peace seems to be fragile 
because it is extremely hard to achieve, however is it actually fragile and easy to break? The 
incident in Oslo on 22
nd
 of July was obviously a challenge for whole Europe and Nordic 
peace in particular. No doubts that situation destabilization and a threat to peaceful 
coexistence were one of the main aims of this terrorist attack. However time showed that this 
terrible incident did not manage to affect Nordic‘s peacefulness and maybe even made Nordic 
states more interconnected in terms of friendship and solidarity. This shows that even though 
pluralistic community of states is hard to establish and maybe even harder to maintain, it is 
not easy to break and the system supports itself from the inside. 
 
3.2 European Arctic as a zone of peace 
In relation to the European Arctic as a target region of research, it might seem unclear if it can 
or cannot be defined as zone of peace. This is mostly because of the impression that the 
concept basically defines states as the main actors in the zone of peace, while the European 
Arctic, as mentioned above, is consists of sub-state entities. However, first of all, even though 
European Arctic is a region of peripheries, there can be no doubts that these are not sub-state 
entities on their own, but states who conduct international politics in the area. Even if 
represented through the territorial units (counties or federal subjects) the national interests 
remain national, which means a part of the state‘s politics. At the same time the definition of 
the zone of peace does not limit its borders to the borders of the states, thus giving a 
possibility to limit it to the other kind of boarders. At the same time the European Arctic 
obviously fits the criteria ―a discrete geographical region of the world, in which the vast 
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majority of a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for at least 
thirty years (a generation)‖. This means that the region itself can be defined as a zone of 
peace, however a very special one, since it does not consist of entire states. 
 
So, looking at the European Arctic as at the zone of negative peace, one can define some 
important features. First of all, as a zone of negative peace, European Arctic can be 
characterized by absence of inter-state war. Moreover, open violent conflicts never happened 
to have place in the region. This can be explained by the fact that the European North and the 
Barents region has historically been the area of cooperation and interaction not only between 
Nordic countries but included Russia as well. For example, the so-called ―pomor trade‖ in 19
th
 
century was a period which gave its birth to the Barents regional cooperation, formed its basis 
by establishing unique common identity and contributed to the common history much more 
than any other era.
66
 The second condition is also satisfied since none of the states represented 
in the area happened to be a violent aggressor during the last generation. It can be argued that 
Nordic countries and Russia happened to be involved into a number of military actions 
outside the region, however none of the states happened to be the initiator of such kind of 
aggression, and the consequences of such involvement never penetrated into the region, thus 
sustaining its ―negative peacefulness‖. 
 
Further, the states in the region are satisfied with the existing territorial status quo. It is, 
however, necessary to identify the nature of this satisfaction. If we talk about satisfaction due 
to ―lack of revintionist intentions and territorial claims towards neighboring states‖ – this can 
be partly true. But lack of revintionist intentions simply originates from the fact that the 
region has never experienced a violent conflict, thus making such intentions impossible to 
appear. At the same time one can hardly say there are no territorial claims in the area, since 
the process of the Arctic delimitation is still ongoing.  If talking about satisfaction originating 
just in existing international law, this seems to be the most relevant explanation of the existing 
satisfaction, but this does not necessarily mean that the territorial situation might not change 
in case the international law permits. And it seems to be completely irrelevant to describe this 
satisfaction due to being the dominant power in the region. First of all, because it is hard to 
identify the dominant power, since a lot of geopolitical actors take part in the ―Arctic game‖. 
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And second, due to region‘s strategic importance, it is hardly possible that the emergence of 
the dominant power will lead to another parties satisfaction. 
 
So these factors make it possible to define European Arctic as at least a zone of negative 
peace, but what happens when it comes to more ―advanced‖ forms of peace? 
 
There are several characteristics that European Arctic shares as a zone of stable peace. First of 
all, ―… domestic and international conflicts might occur, but remain non-violent‖
67
. 
Territorial disputes, as mentioned above, are resolved peacefully, however, at the same time, 
their existence without any doubt affects the peacefulness of the region. According to Young 
there are three categories of concerns that are most likely to raise non-violent tensions in the 
region‘s future: first, those requiring the resolution of jurisdictional issues among the Arctic 
states; second, those centering on relationships between the Arctic states and non-Arctic states 
interested in the region; and third, those raising questions about the protection of Arctic 
ecosystems and cultures; and none of them, however, is likely to end up as ―brutal, bitter and 
bloody confrontation waged between rival international powers that are desperate to acquire 
the world‘s diminishing supply of natural resources‖.
68
 Secondly, there is a normative 
consensus peaceful change and certain willingness for European Arctic cooperation. This is 
proven by the resent Russian-Norwegian treaty concerning maritime delimitation and 
cooperation in the Barents sea and the Arctic ocean as well as by rising level of the Arctic 
states cooperation and interaction.  And finally, region experiences no civil war or other 
uprisings which this proves its relative peacefulness. 
 
However, it is hard to say that the probability of war in the Arctic ―is so small that it does not 
really enter into the calculations of the leaders involved‖.
69
 Since the region is enormously 
reach in its potential, many researches still have a lot of doubts about its security and 
peacefulness. At the same time the statement that the states of the European Arctic are not 
involved into interventions in other parts of the world is also not a true one, and this affects 
the region‘s peacefulness. Recent growth of the military powers in the region is also not likely 
to contribute to the European Arctic being regarded as a zone of stable peace. 
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So, it is quite hard to say whether the region can be fully described as a zone of stable peace 
or it is on its way. 
 
Even though the Nordic region is described as a pluralistic community of states due to its lack 
of ethnic and cultural differences, common political culture, high level of interdependence 
between member-states, geographical location of the area, long historical traditions of 
peaceful dispute settlement,
70
 the European Arctic generally cannot be characterized as one, 
basically because it is a bigger region and it fails to share all the criteria mentioned above. It 
does not show a desired level of multi-level integration and political interconnection; however 
it has its potential to evolve into such kind of zone of peace.  
 
Even though it is hardly possible to characterize an area as a pluralistic security community, it 
might be reasonable to define the premises it has to become such a region in the future. 
Firstly, it refers to rich history of cultural exchange and certain level of common Northern 
mentality as well as shared values and ―we-feeling‖ the region used to experience in the past. 
Secondly, because certain expectations of peaceful change and ongoing growing processes of 
cooperation in the area. A crucial characteristic that the region lack to become a pluralistic 
community of states is sharing political institutions, however the Arctic council has its 
potential of evolving from the urgent issues discussion body to an organization providing 
political interconnection, interdependence and integration of the political institutions in the 
Arctic, thus encouraging sovereignty pooling. These factors are likely not only to ensure the 
peacefulness of the region, but also to bring the area to a completely new level of cooperation. 
 
So after examining three types of zones of peace, the European Arctic was found to fail to be 
characterized as a pluralistic community of states, however performing certain potential for 
future transformation. As a zone of negative peace it is characterized by the absence of war 
and satisfaction with territorial status quo due to existing international laws. As a zone of 
stable peace it is basically characterized by territorial disputes being resolved peacefully, 
absence of civil war and other uprisings and normative consensus on peaceful change. But at 
the same time region‘s militarization and member-states involvement into the interventions 
outside the region affect the understanding of the area as a zone of stable peace. 
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This chapter was intended to outline conceptual framework of the thesis. Concept of zones of 
peace has been introduced in order to understand the issue of state of peace and how it is 
influenced by territorial concerns in the European Arctic. This concept seeks to explain the 
nature of peaceful relations between states in different parts of the world. Thus it makes it 
relevant for investigating the state of peace in the study area. 
 
Three types of zones of peace were discussed in relation to ground concept: zones of negative 
peace, zones of stable peace and pluralistic community of states. Zone negative peace refers 
to a sub-group of states within a region that are satisfied with status quo I t is also 
characterized by absence of war and civil war between and within the states. Incidents of 
violent clashes, however, may occur. Zones of stable peace are characterized by states and 
non-state actors in the region generally preferring status quo to violent conflict escalation as 
well as international (inter-)state and domestic conflicts remaining non-violent. And finally 
pluralistic security community is characterized by dependable expectations of peaceful 
change among its population and interdependence between democratic states / major political 
actors. 
 
Further I tried to make a brief analysis of European Arctic in relation to zones of peace 
theory. Analysis has shown that study region fails to fit the criteria of pluralistic community, 
but at the same time can be described as a zone of negative peace; however it is difficult to 
say whether it can be called a zone of stable peace. Analysis results are represented in Table 
3.1 
Table 3.1. European Arctic as a zone of peace 
Zone of peace Characteristic Met or not 
Zone of negative peace Absence of war 
Actors satisfied with territorial status-quo 
Yes 
Yes 
Zone of stable peace Territorial disputes resolved peacefully Yes 
36 
 
No civil war or other uprisings 
 Consensus on peaceful change 
States not taking part in military interventions in 
other parts of the world 







community of states 
Stable expectations for peaceful change 






Thus the state of peace in the European Arctic still remains unclear. It is quite hard to say 
whether the region managed to evolve to the state of stable peace or is still a zone of negative 
peace. It is also not clear how territorial issues influence the state of peace in the study area. 
This questions will be further examined in the next chapters, as I move on to the dialogue 
between the theory and the empirical material in data presentation and analysis.
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
In this chapter I will focus on methodological issues, such as choice of study area, informants 
and data collection technique. Chapter also reflects on data-collection technique and its 
strengths and weaknesses in relation to research context. And I also reflect upon my role as a 
researcher and how such attributes as language, nationality, being local/non-local influenced 
it. 
 
4.1 Study area 
As described in Chapter 1, European Arctic is a rather big area; this might create an 
impression that data collection in this region a rather complicated task. However, defining 
local actors representing countries and involved into trans-border relations did not happen to 
be hard for me, as I decided to collect my data in the cities, which have proven to be active on 
the international Arctic arena. 
 
The city of Arkhangelsk was founded in 1584. It has a population of about 330 thousand 
people and is the administrative center of the region.
71
 In the period of 1814 – 1917, 
Arkhangelsk was the center of so-called Pomor trade (―originating from Russian Pomorye”) 
which from the early 18
th
 century developed ―in a wide variety of forms‖, including common 
language, used mainly for trade, exchanging Norwegian fish to Russian grain, flavor and 
wooden products, cultural exchange and long-going perspectives.
 72
 At the age of Arctic polar 




In relation to nowadays European Arctic, Arkhangelsk is often called the Russian ―gateway to 
the Arctic‖. It serves the base for a fishing fleet and the western terminus of the Northern Sea 
Route. The city and the Region is an active participant in Barents Cooperation and Norwegian 
Barents Secretariat has an office there. After the opening of Northern (Arctic) Federal 
University in 2010, Arkhangelsk became the main scientific center in the Russian Arctic 
Politics with ambitions of becoming an institution that accumulates best Russian Arctic 
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scientists in various disciplines.
74
 And last, but not least, Arkhangelsk is an important Russian 
Arctic politics center. Offices of numerous politicians, decision makers, advisers and other 
people involved into the Arctic issues are situated here, which makes the city a relevant area 
for data collection. 
 
The city of Tromsø is the second area of data collection. Troms County in Northern Norway 




Just like Arkhangelsk, back in the days, Tromsø served as Norwegian ―gateway to the 
Arctic‖, being a starting point of numerous Arctic expeditions of Nansen and Amundsen. It 
has also been a big economic center of Northern Norway due to its extensive trade 
connections with Northern Russia. 
 
Nowadays Tromsø is still and important city in the European Arctic. The Secretariat of the 
Arctic Council (a high-level intergovernmental forum that addresses issues faced by the 
Arctic governments and the indigenous people of the Arctic) is located there. It is also a huge 
scientific hub in the Northern Norway, including the university with around 12000 students 
and 2700 staff
76
 and research center consisting of about 500 scientists from 21 institutions 
involved in interdisciplinary research in the fields of natural science, technology and social 
sciences.
77
 This makes Tromsø an important point for access to data concerning the issues 
about the European Arctic. 
 
And, finally, Kirkenes – a city in Northern Norway, close to the Russian and Finnish border 
with around 9800 inhabitants. What makes this city special in terms of adding it into the study 
area is that the Barents Secretariat is located there, thus making this city a centre of cross-
border cultural, educational and business relations in the Barents Region. 
 
That were the three primary cities included into my study area. However, keeping in mind that 
European Arctic consists of plurality of realities, I have also partly conducted my research in 
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Copenhagen, Kiruna and Rovaniemi. However, for this research a different method was 
used.
78
 Thus, my study is based on the premise that ―the only way to find a larger vision is to 
be somewhere in particular.‖ And further in my research I will try to combine these particular 
pieces of information into the full picture of the study area.  
 
4.2 Data collection technique: Fieldwork 
 
Emphasizing the human dimension 
Most of the studies on the issues of peace and security in the European Arctic rely on the 
official facts and documents, such as international agreements, conventions and strategies, 
thus leaving the personal attitudes of policy-makers behind. Some of them, however, take 
human dimension into account by bringing quotations of the stakeholders‘ representatives. 
Nevertheless, these studies can easily be criticized for representing the limited perspective by 
reproducing the official points of view, rather than the personal perception of the situation. 
 
The choice of this perspective, social researcher wants to prioritize and highlight, defines the 
choice of data collection method and technique used. From the stage of project design I was 
aware about the official points of view over the issues in the European Arctic. At the same 
time, the aim of the study was to emphasize how the European Arctic policy makers 
themselves understand and reflect on the issue of peace in the region, leaving the official 
position behind.
79
 In other words, I wanted to investigate their personal attitude towards this 
phenomenon, thus emphasizing a personal or human dimension in understanding peace in the 
European Arctic. 
 
Thus, when choosing a data collection technique I decided to stay away from mere document 
analysis and content analysis of written sources as they seemed to represent no or very little 
personal reflection. I needed a technique that could make it possible to make personal 
attitudes visible, thus putting human dimension on the foreground. Thus, leaving behind the 
official viewpoints represented in the previous research and mediated in the media, I have 
chosen fieldwork as a prior data-collection technique in order to get direct access to 
informants, their first-hand experience, personal reflections and attitudes towards the issue. I 
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suppose it to be the best and easiest way to emphasize the human dimension and bring 
attention to personal perspective in my research. 
 
4.3 Sampling: size and selection 
 
Informant Selection 
As Rubin & Rubin state, informants should have ―relevant first-hand experience‖ and must be 
―experienced and knowledgeable in the area‖.
80
 In the context of the European Arctic and 
issues of peace in the area, not a big number of people can be said to be able to  have direct 
experience with the issues, described in previous chapter. Due to this, and to the intention of 
gathering as variable data as possible, I decided to keep my sample selection criteria pretty 
simple: an interviewee should be a person anyhow involved into the political processes in the 
European Arctic. By political processes I meant not only issues territorial delimitation, but 
also coordinating cooperation in the area and establishing dialogue in the region. Thus I was 
hoping to get in touch with informants with various backgrounds, points of view and attitudes. 
Such choice of informants has also been determined by regional focus of current research: 
studying attitudes of local actors who cannot influence national politics in the study are, but at 
the same time are involved into trans-border relations and cooperation. Therefore I wanted to 
emphasize the regional dimension by looking at the European Arctic through the prism of 




At the beginning of my fieldwork I was hoping to conduct around 8-10 interviews, however, 
by the end of it I was happy I managed to have six.
81
 Nevertheless, later in 2013, I managed to 
two more interviews in Norway and three outside, thus making a total number of my 
informants ten. 
 
This might seem to be a rather small sample lacking representativeness, but the big number of 
participants is not the main issue when it comes to qualitative research. Kvale (1996:103) 
suggests two reasons for obtaining significant knowledge from a few subjects: 1) 
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quantitavely, each case contains an immense number of observations of single individuals; 
while 2) qualitavely, the focus on single cases makes it possible to investigate in detail the 
relationship of a specific behavior to its context, to work out the logic of relationship between 
the individual and the situation. In other words, the main advantage of a limited number of 
informants is the ability of deeper data-analysis and paying more attention to detail. 
 
Taking this as basic premises for my research, I was happy with a number of 10 interviewees 
as a quite common number in current interview studies.
82
 This made me feel that the main 
goal of my data collection – obtaining deep and good-quality data – has been fulfilled. 
Furthermore, during the process of data collection I started to realize that a bigger sample was 
simply useless, since certain themes, opinions and reactions seemed to be pretty much similar. 
As one of my informants said at the very beginning of the interview: ―I’m afraid I am not able 
to surprise you and tell anything different from what they [other informants] already said. We 




Qualitative interview as a method of data collection 
As mentioned above, the scope of present study focuses on persons anyhow involved into the 
political processes in the European Arctic and their perceptions and interpretations of peace in 
the area. As noted by Bryman (2008: 466) these issues are ―resistant to observation‖. In other 
words, these kinds of aspects seem to be hard to get from simple observation or ethnography. 
This is why I decided a qualitative interview to be the best data collection method for current 
research: 
 
“Researchers often choose qualitative interviews over ethnographic methods when their topics of 
interest do not center on particular settings but their concern is with establishing common patterns or 




As a research method, qualitative interview is based on ―guided conversation‖ and ―attempts 
to understand the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ 
experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations‖.
84
 As Warren 
(2002:83) writes, the purpose of the method is ―to derive interpretations, not facts or laws, 
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from respondent talk‖. In other words, researcher carefully listens ―so as to hear the meaning‖ 




So, as long as the main aim of research was not to shed light on the facts that are easily 
accessible through media and scientific sources, but rather to investigate, how the first-hand 
actors reflect upon these issues, qualitative interviewing has been chosen as a primary method 
for the present study, being able to represent certain perceptions of a particular social group. 
 
Conducting Interviews 
Two interviews were conducted in Tromsø and four in Arkhangelsk during the fieldwork 
period in September and October 2012. One interview was conducted in Kirkiness and three 
more in Copenhagen, Kiruna and Rovaniemi after the actual fieldwork in April 2013. All the 
informants were interviewed only once with an average interview length of forty five minutes. 
The shortest interview lasted for about half an hour and the longest took about one hour and 
twenty minutes. All the interviews were tape-reordered and the interviewees were aware of 
that. Six interviews were conducted at the informants‘ workplaces in their offices. All of them 
were conducted during the working hours of the interviewees, however, my informants have 
been really helpful and managed to put all their current work aside in order to pay me as much 
attention as possible. At the same time the office personnel moving around and a couple of 
unexpected phone calls might have been a stressful factor and are likely to have affected the 
quality of data. One interview was held at the quite room at the university in Arkhangelsk 
during the lunch break at the conference which both I and my informant were visiting. This 
was the only possibility due to informant‘s busy schedule and the limited duration of the 
lunch break in this case might have also influenced the data quality. As long as it is not 
always possible to have face-to-face conversation during your data collection, I had to choose 
a compromise and conduct three interviews (the ones in Copenhagen, Kiruna and Rovaniemi) 
via telephone. 
 
As qualitative interview has been chosen as a research method, I decided to use its semi-
structured model, in which the scholar to a certain extent follows an interview guide (the 
script) – a list of topics and guidelines to frame the conversation, however the format is 
flexible and the informants are free to bring on the issues they consider to be relevant about 
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 Following this principle, I was encouraging my interviewees to talk about the 
issues they considered to be important. Due to this, I asked many questions that were not 
included into my interview guide at the beginning, as I picked them from the things my 
informants said, and after each interview I was improving and correcting my script. Thus each 
conversation turned out to be unique, which, I believe, helped me to collect data of the better 
quality. 
 
Generally, the informants showed a lot of interest to the topic and were very willing to 
participate in the research. Some misunderstandings occurred only during negotiating 
access
87
, while during the interview itself they were easily resolved by deeper explanations. 
During the interviews atmosphere was relaxing and friendly and afterwards many 
interviewees stated they were pleased to provide their perceptions and opinions on the topic. 
Some of the informants even offered further help with research and gaining access to more 
data. One of them even wondered if it was possible to mention him as a co-author of the 
study. 
 
Usually, after conducting an interview I ended up with an off-topic discussion about my 
research and studies. All the informants showed curious interest in my research, its 
motivation, findings and progress. Many of them were interested about my study program and 
its contents. Informants from Russia also showed a keen interest on the system of education in 
Norway and how different it was from the Russian system I was previously used to.
88
 Quite 
often I was told that I have chosen a relevant topic to study and it could be good to continue 
further research on it. Even though these off-topic conversations are not completely relevant 
to the scope of quality data collected, I consider them to be one of the elements forming the 
context of data collection and from time to time I will refer to them in further parts of my 
research. 
 
4.5 Challenges and reflections 
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4.5.1 Gaining and negotiating access 
―Problems of gaining access often come as a rude surprise to the researcher who has 
developed a research design and is eager to get down to the important task of finding some 
answers‖.
89
 I happened to be the one who faced this problem as well. As my potential 
informants had a rather high social status and position, there were certain difficulties I had to 
deal with during my research design and data collection. 
 
Establishing contact 
According to Odendahl and Shaw (2001: 307), gaining permission to interview an elite 
subject typically requires extensive preparation, homework and creativity on the part of 
researcher. My first steps when establishing contacts with potential informants was simply 
getting their contact details from the public sources. However, as noticed by Feldman et. al. 
(2003: 23), it often happens that even after finding the right people, making initial contact still 
requires much work. So, as long as ―initial contacts often takes place through a letter‖
90
, my 
next step was writing e-mails to my potential respondents. During this first contact I tried not 
to bore the potential informant with loads of information, just stating I was a student 
conducting the research and why I was interested in ―interviewing this particular person‖, in 
order to help them see ―why they would want to spend their time finding out about the 
research‖ (ibid.: 25, 23). 
 
Nevertheless, using this method for gaining access appeared to be rather challenging. Many 
potential participants did not even respond the mails, many of them replied it was impossible 
to find time in their tight schedule and one even replied he doubted his experience and 
knowledge being relevant for this kind of research. One can only guess if that were the real 
reasons of refuse or they were simply unwilling to talk to me. Glesne (2006: 45) emphasizes 
that ―[i]t is easy to overreact and become paranoid when faced with negative responses to 
requests to interviews‖. Keeping this in mind I was satisfied with a number of positive 
responses I got. Nevertheless, even though ―rejection may be unrelated to anything you have 
done or could have done‖ I took into consideration Glesne‘s statement that it could be ―a 
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Role of gatekeepers 
During my preliminary research design I was completely relying on establishing initial 
contacts completely by myself. However, after getting numerous rejections, I started doubting 
effectiveness of this access strategy. Thus, I began to think it could be good to acquire one or 
two ―insiders‖ who are ―familiar with the individuals and politics involved‖
92
 and with whom 
I could ―establish considerable rapport and trust and who are willing to spend time 
familiarizing [me] with the elite under consideration‖.
93
 In other words, since study involved 
certain kinds of organizations and agencies, I found it useful to make contacts with 




As noted by Feldman et.al. (2003: 31) if the researcher fails to acquire a gatekeeper, then 
every individual is the person who can grant access, which means with every potential 
informant I had to start from the scratch again. In order to avoid this, I started thinking of a 
person, who could become a gatekeeper for me.  As noticed by Rubin & Rubin (2005: 89), 
researchers often make use of their social networks in order to find and gain access to 
informants and gatekeepers, so, however, quite surprisingly for me; I managed to find my 
gatekeepers pretty quickly. As long as I still had good relationships with my ex-department at 
my previous university in Arkhangelsk, one of the professors, who had an extensive network 
of contacts with local European Arctic policy-makers agreed to introduce me to some 
informants and to ask them for assistance with my research. The second gatekeeper was my 
old friend working at Arkhangelsk region administration, who managed to persuade two of 
his bosses to become the participants of my study. 
 
Thus, obtaining the gatekeepers made my research much easier through their grant of my 
initial access to informants. Feldman et.al. (2003: 31) explains this phenomenon by the 
assumption that a gatekeeper as this person in a sense actually vouches for the legitimacy of 
the researcher to all the other people to whom one gains access. When it comes to my 
gatekeepers, I can also mention that they helped me not only with resolving legitimacy issues, 
but also with some practical matters, such as accommodation, transportation and physical 
access to restricted administration buildings, thus being extremely valuable contributors to 
current research. 
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Thus, establishing initial contact (myself or through the gatekeepers) was the hardest part for 
me in terms of gaining access. But, even though, ―gaining access is an initial undertaking, 
maintaining access is another matter; it may be occasioned by the changes that occur in the 
expectations and needs of both researcher and researched at any time in the course of the 
research process‖.
95
 This happened to me as well. After arriving to one of my fieldwork 
destinations in Arkhangelsk I found out that three research participants cancelled the 
interviews saying they were busy or simply saw no purpose of meeting me. 
 
Thus, in order to maintain and develop my established contacts, I decided to follow Feldman 
(2003: 35)  advise and concentrate on developing rapport with people who could provide 
information. Rapport in this context refers to ―a harmonious relationship between researcher 
and informant‖.
96
 In other words, my task was to develop a certain level of trust with my 
potential informants. During the initial contact phase I got an impression that some of the 
informants had certain level of mistrust about me, my research and interviewing. As explained 
by Odensdahl and Shaw (2002: 299), this mistrust is understandable as ―they [elites] tend to 
protect themselves from outsiders‖. Therefore, my task for the next step was to overcome this 
mistrust. In other words, I needed ―to ally the initial fears that they [my interviewees and 
informants] might have had about the research‖.
97
  Thus, since the initial contact has already 
been established, I did not hesitate to contact them again, this time, via telephone. This time, 
together with arranging tentative interview dates, I provided them with full details about 
myself, my program of study, my research, its purpose, methods, and their ability to benefit. I 
also especially pointed the issues of anonymity and assured potential informants the no 
personal data will be revealed. After doing this, when meeting my informants in person, they 
did not seem to be suspicious about me and my research, which makes me believe that ―a 
basic sense of trust has developed [and] that allowed the free flow of information‖,
98
 thus 
making better quality data available. 
 
                                                     
95
 Glesne, Corrine. 2006. Becoming Qualitative Researchers. 1st ed. Boston: Pearson/Allyn & Bacon,. p. 45 
96
 Spradley quoted in Feldman, Martha S, Jeannine Bell, and Michele Tracy Berger. 2003. Gaining Access. 1st 
ed. Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press, p. 35 
97
 Feldman, Martha S, Jeannine Bell, and Michele Tracy Berger. 2003. Gaining Access. 1st ed. Walnut Creek, 
Calif.: AltaMira Press, p.23 
98
 ibid. p. 35 
47 
 
At the same time, developing rapport not only influenced the quality of data, but also helped 
me to get more informants, thus making the primary data body more diverse. One of the 
informants in Kirkiness, after a long and thoughtful conversation about my research, decided 
to help me. She not only provided me with contact details of potential interviewees in Sweden 
and Finland, but also contacted them herself and encouraged to participate in my study, thus 
becoming an informant and a gatekeeper at the same time. Furthermore, an informant from 
Sweden also contributed to my study by helping me to establish connection with informant 
from Denmark. In this respect I managed to establish my small research network, based on the 
social networks of the other research participants. In other words, I experienced the 
phenomenon of so-called snowball sampling: in which participants or informants ―with whom 
contact has already been made, use their social networks to refer the researcher to other 
people who could potentially participate in or contribute to the study.‖
99
 This networking not 
only helped me to get a bigger number of informants, but also gave me access to data which 
was inaccessible for me before, thus, making my research more representative. 
 
4.5.2 Researcher’s identity 
The concept of identity is not simple to describe, since it accumulates several dimensions 
from psychology, social anthropology and philosophy, however, it plays a significant role in 
social research. Since defining and explaining the concept of identity is not the purpose of 
current research, the definition by Brossard will be taken as ground. It explains identity as 





In this part of the chapter I will focus and reflect on such elements of my identity as language 
and nationality, since they were the most remarkable ones influencing my research. 
 
Language 
As described by Hennik (2008: 22), ―language and communication are the basis of qualitative 
research‖: 
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“Language is a fundamental tool through which the qualitative researcher can understand human 
behavior, social processes and the cultural meanings surrounding human behavior. Language 
represents data in qualitative research and communication is the process through which data is 
generated between a researcher and a study participant. In cross-cultural research, the researcher is 
often at a distance with the study participants from another culture both culturally and linguistically. 
To improve accurate methodology in cross-cultural qualitative research, a researcher has to pay 
attention to language and communication issues throughout the entire research process. It is 




In my case, while conducting a cross-cultural research, language was a big advantage and 
challenge at the same time. Being a native Russian speaker has certainly contributed to the 
quality of my data, since there was no language barrier between me and my Russian 
informants. Hennik (2008: 24) argues that ―research participants provide their ―best‖ accounts 
to researchers who share social and cultural characteristics‖. Thus, speaking Russian as a 
mother tongue can be considered as an important element of developing the rapport. There 
were several reasons of deciding to conduct interviews with my Russian informants in their 
native language. First, I believed that giving them an opportunity to express themselves in 
their mother tongue is likely to make them feel more comfortable, thus establishing a better 
feeling of trust between the researcher and the participant. Second, I thought that interviewing 
in Russian will help me to obtain the deeper and richer data. Third, it made it easier for me to 
follow the interview process, react and ask the follow-up questions. And last, but not least, 
very few of my Russian informants had a level of English appropriate to give a full and deep 
interview. 
 
On the other hand, since my informants were not only from Russia, I had to use English as a 
primary language of interviewing. Even though I consider myself fluent in English, I found it 
sometimes challenging to conduct interviews and consider using it had some disadvantages. 
First comes the problem of language competence – my English is obviously not as fluent as 
my Russian – it has affected my confidence as an interviewer. I could not show the same level 
of reaction, asking follow-up questions, asking for explanations and clarifications, as I could 
when interviewing in Russian. Even though I am very satisfied with the quality of English 
data obtained, while transcribing interviews of my informants I noticed that sometimes I 
could be more ―attuned and responsive‖.
102
 In other words, I could make a semi-structured 
interview more deep and rich. 
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At the same time, my informants were also limited in their means of expression as none of 
them spoke English as a mother tongue. Thus the data provided by them was limited with 
their English skills. Even though all of them had a very good level of English, it was not 
always possible to hear their attitudes towards certain issues, since they were not always able 
to express their thoughts ―in corpore‖. English was also a stress factor in terms of comfort for 
both interviewees and the researcher. In my case, after the first interview in English I made 
some analysis and no longer found interviewing in English uncomfortable, but I could see that 
my informants felt a certain discomfort because of English when starting an interview. At the 
same time using English involved a problem of oral misunderstanding when participants 
sometimes just did not understand my questions or I did not understand their answers, which 
resulted in long paraphrasing and clarifying, hence making interviews longer and more 
exhausting. 
 
Thus, my inability (or limited ability in case with Norwegian) to speak my research 
participants‘ native language had a small impact on the quality of core data body, however, 
did not affect it dramatically. Moreover, when it comes to my Norwegian interviewees, I even 
made some use of my limited Norwegian language skills. When interviewing them, I always 
started and finished our conversation in Norwegian by thanking them for their research 
participation, explaining about myself and my study and talking about some unrelated matters 
like weather, how I liked their town, etc. These conversations have no value in terms of 
obtaining any important data, but I consider them valuable in terms of establishing the 
connection and developing the rapport between the researcher and participant. 
 
Role of my nationality 
Just like speaking Russian, being a Russian citizen was both an advantage and disadvantage in 
my research. Nationality was a factor that I could not hide; hence both I and my informants 
had to deal with it. 
 
―Because the interviewer contributes actively to the conversation, he or she must be aware of 
his or her own opinions, experiences, cultural definitions, and even prejudices.‖
103
 Having 
grown up in Russia, I, of course, shared some political values of the state, which were always 
at the background of my mind. Moreover, growing up under state propaganda, I, without any 
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doubt, was influenced by its willingness to re-establish Russia as a great world power, 
defending its national interests and holding firm position on the international arena. As a 
Russian citizen I want a better life for my country, thus I, of course have my own perception 
and a viewpoint on the research topic. Moreover, I grew up in Arkhangelsk – the birthplace of 
the Russian fleet, the first port of the country and the city with great Arctic exploration 
history, which is now considered to be ―the Russian gateway to the Arctic‖. Thus, throughout 
my life I have been always quite close to the Arctic issues, which, has, probably made me 
more sensitive about the topic than an ordinary non-northern Russian.  
 
So, from the point of view of having a strong personal perception and opinion, my 
―Russianness‖ was certainly a disadvantage for me as a researcher. Keeping this in mind, I 
tried to be a neutral scholar, leaving my personal attitudes as far behind as I could. One of the 
factors that actually helped me doing this was the fact that I was a student of a foreign 
university, which motivated me to position myself as an independent researcher, not affected 
by the issue of his nationality. However, at the same time, I strongly kept in mind that my 
foreign degree should by no means result into mere criticism of the Russian Arctic politics. 
Thus, by overcoming my ―Russianness‖ and turning into a neutral independent researcher I 
believe I managed to obtain a certain level of scientific objectivity. 
 
Another disadvantage of being Russian was my non-Russian respondents‘ attitude towards 
my patriotic feelings and their unwillingness to hurt them. This often resulted in interviewees 
carefully selecting words, and being afraid to say something improper during the 
conversation. When they were criticizing Russian politics, they were careful in their 
expressions, always trying to bring something positive right after criticism. Sometimes I had a 
feeling they did not want to criticize too much in order not to hurt my above-mentioned 
―Russianness‖. This could be simple politeness, or their desire to avoid conflict, however, 
explaining this phenomenon is behind the scope of current research. Anyway, despite this, the 
data obtained from my non-Russian informants was quite deep and interesting and of high 
value for my research. 
 
However, at the same time, my nationality was also an advantage. First and foremost, it 
greatly contributed to my access to the informants. Speaking about Russian informants, it 
made the search and negotiating access easier. As attitudes of the Russians towards their co-
nationals are, obviously, different from attitudes towards foreigners, I was able to establish 
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initial contact and develop the rapport more simply and effectively. Generally, ―access to the 
informants is tied up with issues of identity, language and culture‖.
104
 As mentioned above, 
informants tend to have more trust to people with whom they share cultural and social 
characteristics; hence my nationality was an important contributing factor in developing good 
interviewer-interviewee relationships. However, being a Russian studying in a foreign 
university was sometimes challenging, as it caused certain level of mistrust and suspicion 
from my research participants. As one of the interviewees said after the conversation: ―I 
thought, Russians who study abroad only write about bad things in their country‖. At the 
same time my nationality also contributed to my access to the non-Russian informants. They 
found it really interesting and uncommon that a Russian student was making a research on   
the areas of their expertise. As one of them mentioned: ―before I was only interviewed by 
Russian journalists, but never by Russian researchers‖.  
 
4.6 Summary 
At this chapter I focused on methodological issues of my research. Due to complicity of the 
study area, data collection was carried in the cities of Tromsø, Kirkenes, Copenhagen, Kiruna, 
Rovaniemi, Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. This helped me to obtain diverse and full data. In 
order to emphasize the human perspective which refers to European Arctic policy makers‘ 
personal perceptions of issues of peace, I chose qualitative interviewing as a primary method 
of data collection. All together 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted within the study 
area in October 2012 and April 2013. Negotiating and gaining access to the informants 
happened to be a challenging task, since establishing initial contacts was quite hard. However, 
use of the gatekeepers contributed to rapport establishment as well as development of initial 
contact. Moreover, developing contacts resulted into snowball sampling, which provided 
access to new informants and thus ensured data diversity. I found my identity both 
advantageous and challenging. Obviously, since the sample was rather diverse in their 
identities, my nationality and language had a certain impact on access and data quality. 
Nevertheless, I believe that for this research my identity was rather advantageous than 
disadvantageous. 
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Chapter 5. Data presentation and analysis 
This chapter presents and discusses the field data. It starts with presenting the participants‘ 
backgrounds, especially focusing on issues of their citizenship and occupational background, 
followed by the issues of age, education and time of being involved into the international 
issues in the European Arctic. Further the chapter proceeds with informants‘ reflections on the 
issues of peace in the study area and role of the territorial factor in the Arctic peace through 
the theoretical concepts discussed in Chapter 3. Ending with some thoughts and conclusions 
about the future of international Arctic cooperation and development. 
 
5.1 Informant presentation 
 
5.1.1 A note on informant anonymity 
Even though peace in the European Arctic might seem to be not a sensitive topic, I have 
decided to ensure anonymity of my informants. This was mainly done for two reasons. First, 
as stated above, by stating to the interviewee that all the information provided will be 
anonymous I was hoping to develop a better feeling of trust and rapport. If the informants 
know that their words will not be directly associated with them individually, they are more 
likely to trust the interviewer. Hence, the informants are also more likely to provide more 
deep and quality data, since the level of feeling trust and security is likely to be higher during 
this kind of interviews. Security of my informants was the second reason I decided to cover 
their identities. Since I was expecting to have a sincere conversation, I did not want any 
thoughts provided by my informants to affect their lives or careers in any way. Even though it 
was quite unlikely for them, I did not want my research to put anyone into any kind of 
uncomfortable situation.  
 
Thus I decided to assure confidentiality and anonymity of my informants in the best way I 
could. Firstly, I have chosen to give all the interviewees fake names to assure the information 
provided by them is not associated with their personality. And secondly, I decided not to 
provide all the personal details of my interviewees to make it even harder to identify them. 
This might make my research less representative, since it reduces the possibility to look 
deeper into the context. However, I have chosen to compromise between the desire for more 
profound research, on the one hand, and the desire to minimize any kind of possible 




5.1.2 Background of informants 
 
Citizenship and occupation 
Total of 10 people were interviewed for the study. Figure 5.1 illustrates their nationality and 
occupational backgrounds. Four of the informants had Russian citizenship; three of them were 
Norwegian, one Swedish, one Danish and one Finnish. Three of the informants were from 
Arkhangelsk, which, as mentioned above, is referred as Russian gateway to the Arctic, one 
was originally from Arkhangelsk, but his work required regular ―roaming between 
Arkhangelsk, St. Petersburg Murmansk and Moscow‖
105
. Two of the participants were from 
Tromsø – a big Norwegian Arctic city and one from Kirkenes – the center of Norwegian 
Barents cooperation. One participant lived and worked in Copenhagen – capital of Denmark, 
one – in Kiruna and one in Rovaniemi. 
 
Interviewees‘ occupation included the following fields: national (Russian, Finnish, Danish) 
Arctic politics, Russian-Norwegian relations, Russian Arctic shipping politics, International 
Arctic cooperation and Barents cooperation. Therefore, all the research participants were 
involved into Arctic development issues on the regional level, thus emphasizing regional, 
rather than national perspective. Some of them, however, were representing national politics 
in the European Arctic, being unable to influence it directly, but implementing it through 
cross-border relations in the area. Others were representing regional perspective through their 
work in different international institutions and organizations specific for the European Arctic. 
Five of the informants were employed by governmental institutions while five were working 
for different international organizations. Interviewing a government employee can have both 
advantageous and disadvantageous. On the one hand, such an informant possesses first-hand 
relevant data. However, on the other hand, such an informant always has an employer at the 
back of the mind. In other words, an interviewee employed by the government, compared to 
the one which is not, during the interviews is more likely to announce the official state 
position, rather than personal perceptions, as they are likely to be shaped by the employer. 
Thus ensuring a 50/50 governmental/non-governmental informants‘ participation can be 
regarded as a compromise for current study.  
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Pseudonym Place of Residence Occupation Working for 
Government 
Andrey Arkhangelsk (Russia) Russian-Norwegian relations  
Sergey Arkhangelsk (Russia) Russian Arctic politics X 
Egor Arkhangelsk (Russia) Russian Arctic politics X 
Anton Arkhangelsk (Russia) Russian Arctic shipping politics X 
Henrik Tromsø (Norway) International Arctic cooperation  
Jonas Tromsø (Norway) International Arctic cooperation  
Helga Kirkenes (Norway) Barents cooperation  
Simone Copenhagen 
(Denmark) 
Danish Arctic politics 
X 
Alfred Kiruna (Sweden) International Arctic cooperation  
Hanna Rovaniemi (Finland) Finish Arctic politics X 




Age, education, time of being involved into the Arctic issues 
All the informants were aged between 35 and 60 years old. All of them had higher education. 
Three of them had educational background in history, four – in international relations, one – 
in linguistics, one – in community development and one in sociology. Thus, all of them had 
humanities educational background. 
 
One of the participants claimed to have been involved into the Arctic issues for longer than 20 
years. Two were involved into international processes in the area for around fifteen years. 
Four worked on these matters for around ten years. One interviewee was involved into Arctic 
issues for nine years and one was claimed to be ―relatively new to this field‖ working with this 
issues for five years. Thus all the participants were quite experienced with the issues in the 
European Arctic. 
 
Summing up, the present interviewees' educational and occupational choices determine them 
as relevant participants of current research. Further, more than half of the informants have 
been involved into international issues in the European Arctic for more than ten years, which 
makes their experience valuable and their data of extreme importance. 
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5.2 Territorial factor 
 
5.2.1 Territory as a peace-influencing factor in the European Arctic 
Land delimitation concerns, previously described in Chapter 2, were one of the most 
discussed topics during the interviews. All the informants agreed that territorial factor ―is a 
matter of great importance and concern in the region‖
107
, thus, in respect to peace studies it 
makes it crucial to investigate how territory influences peace in the European Arctic. 
 
Speaking about the importance of the territorial factor, interviewees explained it as ―…a 
rather sensitive topic for the Arctic states‖
108
. However, they described rather different 
reasons making territorial factor that important. Some of the informants claimed that territory 
is important “… in respect to countries geopolitical ambitions‖
109
 and their aspiration for “… 
strengthening their positions in the region and international arena‖
110
, thus recalling the 
geopolitical value of the Arctic territories. Others, however, stressed the economic value of 
the territories, pointing out that ―Territorial claims are obvious in order to gain the legal 
control over the fossil fuel resources‖
111
 and that ―The Arctic rush [for territories] is nothing 
more than countries desire to gain economic profit from resources development and shipping 
routes‖
112
. These were the main two points of view over the importance of territory in the 
European Arctic. At the same time most of the informants agreed that those are both 
geopolitical and economic reasons making territory an important issue in the area.  
 
In further discussions I was talking with my research participants about territorial disputes in 
the region in respect to their importance pointed out earlier in Chapter 2 in order to find out 
their influence on state of peace in the European Arctic. 
 
Russia – Norway’s dispute upon delimitation in the Barents Sea 
When describing Russia – Norway‘s tensions about delimitation of the Barents sea, many of 
the informants mentioned it could become the most dangerous case for peace in the European 
Arctic: 
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―This was, definitely, the case that was mostly affecting the peaceful relations between two countries 
and their kind neighborhood relations. […] Moreover, this uncertainness in border delimitation was 
not only concerning Russia and Norway, but was creating some tensions in the whole Arctic as there 




―I can not say it was directly affecting peace in the European Arctic, but it was definitely the most 




At the same time, since the dispute was solved in a peaceful way, research participants no 
longer considered it as a peace-affecting factor in the European Arctic. As concluded by 
Sergey ―Both parties managed to find the solution and overcome the misunderstandings, so, 
in relation to your research, I assume, this case is out of question‖, followed by Andrey, 
expressing that ―...this is a solved case, so I see no means how it can influence peaceful co-
existence in the Arctic‖. 
 
Moreover, many informants stressed that “… finding a solution to this case, actually 
improved Russian-Norwegian relations and was a big step-forward in peaceful cooperation 
for these countries.‖
115
 As Helga mentioned ―Solving this border case has actually 
contributed to peace, as it removed the “grey zone” tensions between Russia and Norway and 
created the platform for future peaceful Arctic delimitation and deeper political 
interconnection in the area‖.  
 
Thus, research findings show that the territorial dispute between Russia and Norway used to 
be an important factor affecting peace in the European Arctic in the past, but since it has been 
solved, it is no longer a big threat. Moreover, research participants have pointed out one of the 
characteristics of zone of stable peace, where territorial disputes are solved peacefully and 
have even regarded it as a premise for political integration as one of the elements of pluralistic 
community of states. 
 
Legal status of the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area around 
Svalbard 
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When talking about the situation around Svalbard, most of research participants agreed that it 
is hardly likely to affect peace in the European Arctic. Hanna, for example, thinks that ―It 
might be a case for Russian and Norwegian fisheries policies, but it is definitely not big 
enough to influence their peaceful relations‖. She is followed by Sergey, stating that 
“…Svalbard now, is, actually, not a big deal‖:  
 
―Looks like Russia has actually lost its interest in Svalbard and its presence at the archipelago is just 
formal for the reasons of international prestige and standing up for some geopolitical ambitions. 
Territorial claims and matters of recognition of Norwegian authority, however, do not come to the 




Thus, research findings show that, according to the informants, Svalbard case “… does not 
represent a big threat for peace in the European Arctic, at least now‖
117
. Research 
participants agree that it is still creating certain tensions and misunderstandings between 
Russia and Norway, but these tensions, as characterized by Jonas “…are not really crucial for 
relations between two countries‖ hence are not likely to affect peace in the study area. 
 
Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
Research findings show that delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles, described as one of the territorial issues in Chapter 2, is perceived as a matter of 
economic, rather than political interest. As Egor mentions ―I see no geopolitical value in this 
issue, so I consider it to be just the desire for obtaining natural resources‖. 
 
Remarkably, a respondent from Denmark, a country directly involved into this issue, does not 
think it affects peace in the European Arctic: 
 
―I don’t see a big threat for peace in this issue. For me it is obvious that the case will be solved in a 
peaceful way according to the international law. When all the geological surveys will be done, it will 
be Russia, Canada or Denmark obtaining the right to use these territories. It can also be possible that 
geologists will find out that the Lomonosov Ridge is a part of two countries’ or even three countries’ 
continental shelf – in this case there is no other choice as joint cooperation and exploration. Who 
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However, most of research participants agree, that in terms of peace in the European Arctic 
nowadays this dispute might be the most vital. As mentioned by Alfred ―This is a real race 
for resources and in this case countries are doing their best to own them‖. He is followed by 
Helga, characterizing the nature of this ―race‖: ―Russian flag-planting
119
 at the bottom was 
not actually a peaceful act and made it clear that Russia has really serious ambitions in this 
area‖. Moreover, Helga considers this case to be a “… proof of Putin’s plans to secure 
Russia’s strategic, economic, scientific and defense interests
120
 in the Arctic‖. At the same 
time Canadian Arctic strategy, in relation and foreign policy in relation to this case is also 
regarded as ―… too ambitious and kind of aggressive‖
121
, according to my informants: 
―Canada’s claims and region’s militarization certainly do not contribute to peace there.‖
122
 
Thus, must of research participants agree about the extreme importance of this issue for peace 
in the European Arctic. 
 
However, when answering a question if this delimitation dispute is a threat for peace in the 
area, all the interviewees agreed with the Danish representative, concluding that, even though 
some tensions exist, they are most likely to be solved within existing international law and do 
not really affect peace in a dramatic way: 
 
―We should understand that there is actually an existing mechanism of solving this problem, so we 
don’t have to invent anything new. […] I think, countries will just follow the international law as soon 




―It is clearly stated in United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea how to deal with this kind of 
situations. So for me there is no doubt that countries will follow this procedure and the case will be 




Remarkably that research participants from both Sweden and Finland – countries which are 
not directly involved into Arctic shelf delimitation processes and do not have direct access to 
it, look at this issue have a similar point of view with their colleagues from the other 
countries. Therefore they de-emphasize the importance of territorial ambitions in the 
                                                     
119
 In August 2007 Russian expedition have planted country's flag on the seabed 4,200m  below the North Pole. 
It has found massive critique from the international community, regarding this as a Russian claim for the Arctic. 
120
 Here Helga refers to Russian ―Arctic Strategy‖, Russian version can be found at 
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html 
121
 From the interview with Sergey 
122
 From the interview with Egor 
123
 From the interview with Andrey 
124
 From the interview with Hanna 
60 
 
European Arctic and introduce other issues which are of greater importance for peace in the 
region. 
 
Thus, despite the fact that interviewees describe delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles as a most urgent territorial issue in the European Arctic, research findings 
show that it is hardly likely to dramatically affect peace in the region, since the dispute is now 
being dealt according to the norms of international law. 
 
Other territorial disputes 
Research findings show that other territorial issues, mentioned in Chapter 2, as perceived by 
most of the informants do not constitute a huge threat to peace in the study area: 
 
―Most of these disputes are outside the region that you have defined [European Arctic], so they are not 
influencing its peacefulness directly. They might have some indirect effect, but for me it is quite 




However, one of the informants have pointed out one of the disputes mentioned, which, in his 
view, has a certain effect on peace in the region. Anton, being a person involved into Russian 
shipping politics, claimed the Northern Sea Route issue to be of a certain importance for 
peace in the European Arctic. As he has pointed out ―We cannot speak about peaceful 
cooperation in terms of Arctic navigation when countries do not have common agreement 
about the legal status of the basic and most perspective sea route in the Arctic‖. However, at 
the same time, he agreed that ―in relation to the region as a whole, this misunderstanding is 
not likely to be a serious peace-affecting factor […] moreover, I do not consider it to be 
insoluble‖, explaining his special concern by this dispute by his professional occupation: ―I 
might be just too much concerned about it, because it is a direct part of my job‖. 
 
Thus research shows that, besides some concerns due to professional occupation, other 
territorial disputes in the area do not constitute a serious threat to state of peace in the 
European Arctic. Moreover, speaking about all the territorial issues in the area of research, 
informants basically agreed that most of them do not affect peace in the area, and even one 
which is likely to do so, cannot be considered as a real threat, because it is in the process of 
resolution. 
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5.2.2 Territorial ambitions VS Cooperation 
One of the main findings of the research, mentioned in the previous paragraph is that 
territorial factor, unlike traditional perspectives suggest, is not actually the key issue 
determining and affecting peace in the study area. Thus, for me, as for researcher it is 
important to investigate, what are territorial ambitions in the European Arctic replaced by and 
why did countries but them put them aside? 
 
Research findings show that all the informants actually prioritize international, trans-border 
and cross-border cooperation to land claims and confrontation because of the territories. As it 
is described by Sergey: “… countries now begin to understand the value of international 
cooperation in the area, this is why they would rather give up their territorial claims in order 
to profit from mutual collaboration‖. Furthermore, Andrey assumes that it is hardly possible 
for one country to manage Arctic development on its own; therefore compromise and 
cooperation are not only vital, but unavoidable: 
 
―One country cannot simply manage Arctic development alone. Russia, for example, unlike Norway, 
does not possess technologies for drilling in these weather conditions, but at the same time has a 
number of other. Thus, countries are forced to cooperate in order to make the process faster and more 
effective. In my view, this was one of the reasons for the Barents Sea treaty to be signed – why should 
we argue about territories when we can develop them together?‖ 
 
Therefore, research findings indicate a certain change in the way of thinking and a turn 
towards cooperation and region co-development instead of its delimitation. As perceived by 
the interviewees, this change has begun on the regional level and later influenced national 
politics of the Arctic States. 
 
Other research participants also stress the importance of international cooperation and its 
priority over territorial confrontation. As mentioned by Henrik “…countries would benefit 
more from joint cooperation rather than from land possession‖ followed by Helga, saying 
that ―Now […] economic, cultural, scientific benefits [from cooperation] overcome territorial 
misunderstandings. In other words, it’s better now to cooperate than to be in confrontation‖. 
According to Jonas: ―Cold war is over and countries are seeking for partnership, rather than 
confrontation. International connections have now developed into deep form of cooperation, 
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making it possible to forget about territorial misunderstandings. This is why they put their 
territorial claims aside and together search for compromise solutions they can all benefit 
from.‖ He is supported by Hanna, according to her: ―peaceful coexistence and experience 
exchange is likely to be more effective than aggressive land policy‖. Moreover ―Cross-border 
cooperation, rather than international
126
 one is becoming more and more effective, more and 
more visible and, maybe even more and more important.‖
127
 Therefore informants stress the 
importance of cooperation between certain parts of the countries in the European Arctic, 
rather than between the governments, thus emphasizing regional perspective and its 
importance as a peace-contributing factor in the European Arctic. 
 
Thus, research findings show that territorial confrontation and land-claim ambitions in the 
recent years have been replaced by international cooperation and countries‘ desire to benefit 
from it. In further paragraphs I will investigate what is the relation between different forms of 
international cooperation and integration within the institutions in the European Arctic their 
effects on peace in the area. 
 
 
5.3 Perceptions of peace in the area 
 
5.3.1 Negative peace and violent conflict potential 
As mentioned above, the main characteristic of zone of negative peace is ―mere absence of 
war‖. Due to this, all the informants, obviously, agreed that European Arctic can be described 
as a zone of negative peace: ―there is, obviously no armed confrontation in the area; even 
though tensions still exist‖
128
. Followed by Helga, stressing that “…maybe it is hard to call 
Arctic a perfectly peaceful area, but it is definitely formed by peaceful countries. And that 
gives us hope‖. Thus, according to Segrey and Helga, European Arctic experiences two main 
conditions for establishing zone of negative peace, earlier suggested by Archer and Joenniemi 
(2003: 4), which are: 1) absence or very little inter-state war in the region; 2) states should not 
be involved into war with other actors outside the region, and even if they are, this must not 
be initiated by the zone of peace member state. At the same time, Sergey‘s inability (or 
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unwillingness) to describe the region as peaceful makes it important and interesting to define 
the nature of peace in the area. 
 
Talking about the reason, why European Arctic states do not go into war with each other, all 
the informants agree that this must originate in their simple unwillingness to do so:  
 




“…actors simply do not want to waste their money, time and other resources for engaging into violent 




Thus findings show that in the European Arctic, as in the zone of negative peace, peace is 
maintained due to actors‘ unwillingness to go into war, rather than by threats, incapacity or 
deterrence. This is proven by Henrik failing to recall any examples of threats or deterrence: 
―no cases of international threats come to my mind‖ and Simone saying that incapacity is out 
of question since “… there is a number of great military powers concentrated in the Arctic‖.  
 
Moreover, according to Kacowicz (1995: 267), democracies in the zone of negative peace 
―…do not war with each other since they are usually satisfied with the status quo, within their 
own sovereign territories and across their borders‖. Most of the informants supported this 
statement, agreeing that in the European Arctic states are basically satisfied with their 
territorial status quo: ―I believe countries are fine with the territories they possess now‖
131
. 
Three of the informants, however had a different point of view on this issue. Two of them 
(Anton and Simone) noted that even though states in the European Arctic are ―quite satisfied 
with their territorial resources, they will not give up an idea of gaining more‖
132
. Moreover, 
Sergey expressed an idea that at least some countries are not quite satisfied with territorial 
possessions:  
 
―If we [Russia] were satisfied, we would not have sent this expedition in 2007 and search for 
geological proof in order to extend the borders of our continental shelf. I can tell you even more, 
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Danish and Canadian claims for Lomonosov Ridge and North Pole show quite the opposite. We 




Thus not all of the informants agreed that the states in the European Arctic are satisfied with 
their territorial status quo. However, since the majority of informants supported this 
statement, it should be interesting to find out about the nature of this satisfaction. According 
to Kakowicz, this satisfaction can take different forms depending on various characteristics of 
the countries represented, beginning from a) ―lack of revintionist intentions and territorial 
claims towards neighboring states‖; to b) satisfaction ―in relation to the existing regional and 
international orders‖ and respect to international law;  up to c) satisfaction because of being 
the dominant power of in the region.
134
 When talking about the form of satisfaction, 
informants stated that it originates basically ―in relation to the existing regional and 
international orders‖ and respect to international law: 
 
―Arctic States respect the UN Convention on Law of the Sea and other norms of international law, 




―Since Norway and Russia have delimitated their border, territories in the European Arctic are 
legally defined and states are relying on these international regulations‖
136 
 
At the same time, as stated above, two of the informants mentioned that ―even though there is 
the certain satisfaction, according to international law, Arctic Countries will definitely try to 
do their best to extend their territories if such a legal opportunity appears‖
137
 In other words, 
they mean that countries obey the order established by the international law, but, in case 
situation changes, or there will appear a legal opportunity to extend their territories, they will 
try to do it as long as it corresponds to the international law. Therefore, this satisfaction can, 
according to Simone and Anton, be regarded as temporary. 
 
When talking about satisfaction due to being the dominant power of in the region, taking the 
existing geopolitical realities into account, it is quite obvious; none of the interviewees 
mentioned it as the dominating form of satisfaction: ―I think, in the emerging multi-polar 
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world it is hardly possible to talk about the dominant powers or obvious leaders in such a 
“hot” area‖
138
. At the same time, for me, as for researcher, it was quite surprising none of the 
informants mentioned territorial satisfaction taking place due to lack of revintionist intentions 
and territorial claims towards neighboring states. However, when looking deeper, it can be 
easily explained by two facts. First of all, states in the European Arctic simply do not have 
any territorial revintionist intensions; and secondly, as claimed by Henrik: ―territorial 
disputes exist and cannot be ignored‖.  
 
Comparing research findings concerning nature of negative peace in the European Arctic, one 
can say that it is slightly different from the West-African example, described in Chapter 3. 
Like West-African states, states in the European Arctic are satisfied with their territorial status 
quo. However, while in West-Africa they were ―… satisfied with the territories they obtained 
after the break of the colonial world order‖
139
, states at the research area are satisfied due to 
existing international law. Moreover, in Western-Africa states did not get involved into any 
kind of conflicts due to their internal security concerns, which can be described as their 
inability and incapacity of going into the conflict, while in the European Arctic, as described 
by Simone and Jonas they do not do this because of their unwillingness and, again, respect to 
the international law: 
 








However, not all of them agreed or even managed to describe the level of conflict potential in 
the area: 
 
“…looking at it [European Arctic] from the point of view of international conflict – there is no open 
one, however, I would not dare to describe the conflict potential in the region” 
 
“…situation is changing rapidly and, when it comes to me, from time to time I, actually, change my 
mind about the level of probability of conflict here [in the Arctic]” 
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Most of the informants, however, were quite certain about the possibility of violent conflict in 
the area. They expressed an opinion that an open conflict in the Arctic (no matter its European 
part or the whole region) is extremely unlikely to happen. As stressed by Andrey: ―[I] do not 
think that open conflicts are ever going to happen, since the actors understand that its 
consequences can be disastrous‖. Followed by Egor, emphasizing that “..the price [of the 
violent conflict] is too high so I suppose it is extremely unlikely to happen, since the states 
now put more value on collaboration rather than open confrontation‖. 
 
Thus, according to my informants‘ perceptions of negative peace in the European Arctic, 
countries in the area do not go into war with each other due to their satisfaction with their 
territorial status quo, which originates in them following and respecting the existing 
international law. Moreover, the probability of open violent conflict in the region is quite 
miserable and should not be taken into serious account. 
 
5.3.2 Zone of stable peace 
As mentioned before in Chapter 3, in order to be regarded a zone of stable peace, region, 
besides characteristics of zone of negative peace, should experience no or little armed conflict 
in form of civil wars or other uprisings, as well as, countries in the region should not take part 
in military interventions in other parts of the world (except in the forms of internationally 
sanctioned actions).
142
 Both characteristics found support among research participants. None 
of them managed to recall any serious internal conflicts within the European Arctic and also 
mentioned that territorial disputes are resolved peacefully according to norms of international 
law, thus stressing countries‘ desire for peaceful change as another important condition for 
stable peace.
143
 Furthermore all of them agreed that ―Arctic countries do not conduct any 




Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 4), at the same time, add two more characteristics of this zone of 
peace: ―stable peace also means that all conflicts within the region fall short of violent 
resolution, let alone war. The relationship of the states is seen as being societal, suggesting 
closer and more trusting‖.  Research findings, presented above; show that informants consider 
violent conflict quite unlikely to happen. Characterizing relationships between countries in the 
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European Arctic, interviewees tend to speak about cooperation
145
 as a driving force for 
countries getting closer together. Andrey, for example, states that ―International cooperation 
is bringing countries and people closer…‖ Moreover, Helga mentions ―…increased level of 
mutual trust after the break of the Soviet Union‖.  
 
Comparing nature of stable peace in the European Arctic to South-American example, 
explained in Chapter 3, research findings show simple similarities between two examples. 
First of all, nature of negative peace as a basis for further peace evolution was quite the same. 
Moreover, respondents stressed the importance of ―democracy-building processes in Russia 
after the Soviet Union break‖ which have ―…definitely contributed to region becoming a zone 
of lower tensions‖.
146
 However, unlike South-American example Russia was the only country 
in the region experiencing democratization. Moreover, just like in South America, informants 
point out importance of international cooperation, however unlike American example, 
research participants do not dare to point out the leading international organization for 
cooperation in the European Arctic. One unique feature for the European Arctic as a zone of 
stable peace, which differentiates it from South American example is the cross-border 
cooperation in the area, which was leaving relations between states behind and bringing 
attention to the regional-level relations in the North, which, according to Andrey, “…can be 
considered as the main peace-driving force…‖ in the area. 
 
Thus research findings indicate that European Arctic actually follows both the conditions 
described by Kacowicz and Archer & Joenniemi, therefore it can be called a zone of stable 
peace. Therefore it makes it important to investigate whether the region shares some 
characteristics of the most advanced zone of peace which is pluralistic security community of 
states. 
 
5.3.3. Pluralistic community of states 
According to Kakowicz (1997: 170), third type of zones of peace (pluralistic community of 
states) is characterized by: 1) stable expectations of peaceful change; 2) states sharing 
common norms, values, identity; followed by Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 5), stating that 3) 
political institutions should be deeply interdependent or even common.  
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However, informants were uncertain about these characteristics when talking about the 
European Arctic as a third type of  zone of peace. When talking about expectations of 
peaceful change most of the interviewees agreed it exists in the area. As said by Helga: ―For 
me future of the region is, definitely, peaceful‖, followed by Andrey, believing that ―all the 
disagreements and future potential disputes should be and will be resolved peacefully‖. 
However, at the same time, not all of them were so optimistic about it. Sergey expressed a 
different opinion: “…the only alternative to cooperation in the Arctic is war. Which 
alternative will we get in the future? It will depend on countries’ international politics and 
global geopolitical realities.‖ Thus most of the research participants, even though, not all of 
them, characterized European Arctic as a region with certain expectations for peaceful 
change. Therefore, European Arctic can be described as partly sharing this characteristic of 
pluralistic community of states, as certain expectations for peaceful change exist, however it 
is hard to say if they are stable or not. 
 
Discussing common norms, values and identity, the informants agreed the European Arctic, 
unfortunately, cannot be characterized by sharing the common ones: “…in the way you 
described the target region of research […] I cannot say we can talk about common identity 
in this particular case”.
147
 Remarkably, most of the informants noticed that, even though one 
can talk about common Nordic identity, it is not possible to connect it to any kind of common 
identity in the European Arctic: 
 
―There is, certainly, common Nordic identity between the Nordic countries. Here people have been 
connected culturally, politically and even through the language throughout the centuries. However, it 




―Nordic identity is due to their ethnical, linguistic, historical and cultural connections.  But not the 
whole region is that homogenous. Russians, for example; due to obvious reasons, such as different 
language and culture, as well as Soviet period of history; greatly differ from the Scandinavians. 
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Nevertheless, not all the informants were so critical about distancing Russian identity from 
Nordic identity. Some of them recalled the times of 19
th
 century and Pomor trade, which is 
considered to be the zenith of cooperation between Northern Russia and Northern Norway: 
 
―Common norms and values kind of existed at this time [Pomor trade]. People were in constant 
contact and even a common language was developed. So we can say there was some kind of common 




―Russian-Norwegian contacts back in the days were really close. There was Pomor trade, they were 
fishing and hunting seals together. Besides that, both us [Russians] and them [Norwegians] were from 
the North, facing the same challenges and, maybe, values…‖
151 
 
Thus, two informants mentioned the possibility of sharing common norms between the North 
of Russia and North of Norway, however, both of them later mentioned that this identity was 
something different from Nordic one: “…that were mainly hunters and traders, not common 
people, in touch with each other, so, there was no common identity between people, rather, 
between these merchants and hunters‖
152
; followed by Anton doubting that “…this common 
Northern identity was different from common Nordic one‖. Moreover, most of the informants 
did not even want to call it common Russian-Norwegian identity, describing it as ―a long 
history of Northern cooperation‖, which, however had a positive impact on modern history 
and ―resulted into the initiative of Barents cooperation‖.
153
 Thus, according to research 
findings, it is possible to say there are common values, norms and identity in certain parts of 
the European Arctic, but hardly possible to say such thing as European Arctic identity exists. 
 
Interviewees have also noticed that political integration (third and most crucial, according to 
Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 4), condition for evolving into pluralistic community of states) 
in the area is still on a very poor level. As noted by Alfred: ―We still have very low level of 
political interaction in the Arctic‖; followed by Egor, supporting that ―common political 
institutions in the Arctic are still not developed‖. 
 
Lack of political integration is described by research participants in several different ways. 
Sergey, for example, believes that countries in the Arctic avoid active political integration, 
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due to their special political interests in the area: ―Actors do not want to sacrifice their 
mysterious sovereignty in the region. Joint political governance in the Arctic for them might 
mean they can acquire smaller territories in the end‖. Alfred, at the same, supports the idea of 
Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 8), who argue that lack of political integration is rooted in ethnic 
and cultural differences: ―The region is too diverse. […]You know, Russians, they are a bit 
different…‖. He is followed by Hanna, also supporting Archer and Joenniemi‘s (2003: 8) 
thought that common political culture is necessary for close political integration: ―I can’t 
imagine close political integration between two different regimes: Soviet Union and Western 
countries in the region back in the days […] thus, it was impossible to develop deep political 
integration‖. This statement also partly proves Kakowicz‘s idea that pluralistic community of 
states is only possible within democratic states. 
 
Among other reasons for European Arctic failing to be regarded as a pluralistic community of 
states, research participants mention lack of high level of interdependence between the states: 
―Countries now begin to understand they depend on each other, but the level of this 
dependence is still small‖
154
. Possible reasons of this lack of dependence are expressed by 
Sergey when developing his thought about sovereignty:  
 
―Unfortunately, the processes of sharing, exchanging and networking in the European Arctic are 
rather slow. They could be way more effective and extensive. Again, I think that states in this case, 
first and foremost, do not want to share their sovereignty in the Arctic, thus limiting the extent they 
depend on the other countries. Otherwise we could have already built a productive international 




Thus research participants distance European Arctic from the Nordic example explained in 
Chapter 3. First and foremost because this region cannot be described as pluralistic 
community of states due to certain ethnic and cultural differences, lack of common political 
culture and integration, inadequate level of interdependence between member-states. 
Informants, however, have indicated some premises for future evolution into such kind of 
zone of peace, which are emerging common mentality, certain expectations for peaceful 
change and developing cooperation which can bring to future closer political integration. 
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5.4 Role of international cooperation 
Is international cooperation appeared to be such crucial factor influencing the state of peace in 
the European Arctic it was important to find out the mechanisms it is fostered by. Research 
results have shown that informants prioritize role of international organizations and 
institutions for international integration in the process of peaceful cooperation, thus 
emphasizing their role for peace in the European Arctic. 
 
5.4.1 The Arctic Council 
Remarkably, all the research participants agreed that the Arctic Council nowadays is the 
leading institution for ensuring peace and security not only in the European Arctic, but in the 
whole Arctic region: 
 
―For me the Arctic Council is the only body which is somehow capable to serve as guarantor of peace 









―It’s hard to overestimate its’ [Arctic Council‘s] role. It is one of the few international platforms where 





However, while stressing the importance of this international organization, most of the 
informants were uncertain about its‘ efficiency. Thus, Sergey, for example, states that, even 
though Arctic Council is an important for peace, ―its’ efficiency, nowadays, unfortunately is 
pretty small‖, followed by Hanna, saying that it “…is not a real body for sustaining peace in 
the Arctic‖. Moreover, Helga mentioned that “… questions, discussed at the Arctic Council 
meetings are usually quite general and are sometimes very far from urgent realities‖. She is 
followed by Andrey, thinking that the Arctic Council “… should be dealing with more 
important issues‖.  
 
Thus, most of research participants agree that at the certain moment the Arctic Council is not 
efficient enough. However, at the same time, they suggest the ways of increasing its 
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effectiveness by introducing a number of reforms and changes to the organization. Most of 
them suggest providing Arctic Council with more authority: “…first and foremost decision-
making authority obligatory for all the member-states‖.
159
 Moreover, some of the informants 
suggest transforming the organization into a completely new international institution, serving 
as a governance body for the whole Arctic area: 
 
―It should become a governance institution for the whole Arctic space with its legislative, decision-




―It has a potential of becoming an organization like European Union – a full governance body for a 




Thus informants suggest the Arctic Council becoming a common governance body for the 
Arctic region, therefore expressing their expectations of the area making one step forward 
towards future evolution into Pluralistic Community of States by tending to have ―political 
institutions of the member-states closely interconnected or are even common‖ which is, 
according to Archer and Joenniemi (2003: 5), one of the most crucial characteristics of such 
kind of zone of peace. Accordingly, research participants consider the Arctic Council as a 
potential institution which is likely to contribute for European Arctic and Arctic as a whole 
evolving to qualitatively new level of peace and becoming a Pluralistic Community of States. 
5.4.2 Barents Regional Cooperation 
According to research findings, not only Arctic Council is an important international 
organization in terms of peace. All the informants also stressed the role of Barents Regional 
cooperation in the process of establishing and sustaining peace in the European Arctic. 
 
Remarkably, most of research participants were speaking about Barents Region in relation to 
international and cross-border cooperation in the area, thus, again, stressing its importance for 
peaceful Arctic development. As noted by Andrey, ―Barents Regional Cooperation represents 
the strongest type of international connections in the European Arctic [… ] thus creating 
positive environment for developing peaceful co-existence in the region‖. He is followed by 
Helga, saying that “…most effective international cooperation now is taking place within the 
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Barents Region project‖ and Jonas, adding that ―Establishment of Barents cooperation has 
definitely had a huge impact peace in the European part of Arctic‖.  
 
While describing the way Barents Euro-Arctic Region contributes to peace in the study 
region, research participants, again, stress the importance of international cooperation: 
 
―Governments understand that cooperation, such as Barents Regional cooperation, for example, is a 
better alternative to open conflict. Moreover, it’s quite obvious that countries can benefit more from 




―Barents project shows that member-states prioritize cooperation to political confrontation. […] This 
can even mean giving up their territory-extension ambitions in favor of effective political, economic, 




Thus, research findings show that it is mainly cooperation ―in political, economic, cultural 
and human dimensions‖
164
 that makes Barents Region initiative so important for peace in the 
European Arctic. Remarkably, this cooperation takes place on cross-border level, which 
emphasizes regional perspective‘s contribution to peace by keeping all international conflicts 
and misunderstandings out of the area. However, cooperation is not the only peace-
contributing factor about Barents project, which was mentioned by my informants. Henrik, for 
example, brings it to human perspective, claiming that ―Barents connections simply bring 
people together‖, followed by Helga developing his statement: ―It [Barents cooperation] 
provides contacts in many different spheres of life, ensuring better understanding between 
people, friendship and professional collaboration‖. She even relates it to old history, 
emphasizing that Barents initiative “…arose historical connections in the North, reminded 
people of their common Northerners identity and opened the door for bringing this old 
historical cooperation to the new modern level‖. Among other factors making Barents 
Regional Cooperation valuable for peace in the European Arctic, informants named 
―emerging political integration‖
165
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When explaining the reasons of Barents Regional Cooperation initiatives becoming such an 
important platform for developing peace in the area interviewees go into history of its 
establishment. As noted by Egor ―Northern area needed an organization like that in order to 
fill up the vacuum which appeared after the break of Soviet Union‖ Most of them recall long 
history of relations between Northern parts of Norway and Russia: ―Since it was a Norwegian 
initiative, I suppose, Norway was trying to bring back the old good days when cooperation 
with Russia was strong and effective. This history model could become the basis for 
establishing modern cooperation.‖
167
 Some, however, argue that Barents initiative appeared 
because of fear and threat: ―Norway was afraid and did not know what to expect from the new 
neighbor from the East after the Soviet Union collapsed. For me this Norwegian initiative 
looks like an attempt to pacify newly-established Russia, and, apparently, it worked.‖
168
 This, 
however, was just a single opinion; all the other informants agreed that Barents cooperation 
became so important for peaceful region development because of long historical connections 
and new promising opportunities. 
 
Talking about the perspectives of Barents Cooperation, all the informants found it quite 
effective and promising: ―It is now working very good, I think, it has good future‖.
169
 
Remarkably, unlike Arctic Council example, no one of research participants suggested any 
changes in Barents Regional Cooperation structure or the way it functions, thus expressing 
their satisfaction with present functionality. Furthermore, interviewees expressed their hope 
for better future for the project: ―This is a wonderful initiative and I hope it will continue. It 
contributes not only to development of peace, but to development of the whole geographical 




5.4.3 Other aspects of international cooperation 
Among other aspects of international cooperation contributing to peace-building in the Arctic 
research participants mentioned The Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region 
(CPAR)
171
 as an ―…important institution for having meetings at the parliamentary level […] 
and discussing issues of cooperation and Arctic Council functionality.‖
172
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 initiative also found a lot of support between the respondents. 
Jonas mentioned that it “…not only promotes peaceful cooperation in the European part of 
the Arctic, but also brings European Union to the Arctic space and allows it to get involved 
into Arctic politics‖. Moreover Hanna expressed a big hope that “…cooperation within the 
Northern Dimension policy will become stronger and make its contribution to peace there‖. 
 
Simone also mentioned Nordic Council
174
 as an “…important arena for cooperation and 
meeting point for Nordic countries‖. She also mentioned that even though officially this 
institution is aimed at cooperation between Nordic countries ―…it also has a number of offices 
in Russia, thus including it into cooperation framework‖. Therefore Simone considers Nordic 
Council to “… provide great opportunities for future cooperation in the European Arctic‖. 
 
Thus these international initiatives, according to research participants, considerably contribute 
to peaceful international cooperation in the European Arctic. As concluded by Egor: ―There is 
a number of small and medium-scale international projects which actually also greatly 
contribute to cooperation in the region and its peaceful development‖. 
 
5.5 Summary 
In this Chapter I have focused on presenting and analyzing my fieldwork results. Research 
results indicate that informants consider territory to be no longer the main factor affecting 
peace in the European Arctic. Despite the fact, that territorial dispute between Russia and 
Norway upon delimitation of the Barents Sea previously could become a crucial issue for 
peace in the region, since it has been resolved upon the mutual agreement; research 
participants no longer consider it to be a peace-affecting issue. Moreover, they believe that its 
legal settlement has actually contributed to peace in the target region. Legal status of the 
Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area around Svalbard is also perceived to be 
an issue which is hardly likely to affect peace in the European Arctic. Even though 
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delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is considered as a rather 
crucial one, informants believe that it will find its solution within the norms of existing 
international law and will not influence the state of peace in nearest future. 
 
Research findings show that countries‘ territorial ambitions are actually now replaced by 
different kinds of cooperation in the European Arctic. Interviewees expressed the opinion that 
states today actually prioritize the benefits of international, cross-border and trans-border 
cooperation to their territory-expanding desires. Informants especially emphasize the role of 
such international initiatives as the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Region for 
peaceful cooperation in the target region. Arctic Council is referred as an organization of 
greatest importance for political integration and peace in the European Arctic. Moreover, 
informants relate their hopes for future common Arctic governance institution with this 
organization. Barents Euro-Arctic Region is called to be the ground institution for cooperation 
which contributed to ensuring peace in the target area. 
 
In relation to zones of peace theory, research results indicate that European Arctic has made 
its way towards evolution from the zone of negative peace with countries‘ satisfaction with 
their territorial status quo due to existing international law to a zone of stable peace with 
countries staying away from violent conflict resolution with closer and more trustful 
relationships between them. At the same time informants consider the probability of violent 
conflict quite miserable and do not recognize it as a threat. However, interviewees agree that 
European Arctic nowadays cannot be regarded as pluralistic community of states. At the same 
time informants see some premises for the region to evolve to this new kind of zone of peace. 





Chapter 6. Summary and concluding remarks 
 
Introduction 
This thesis has focused on issues of territory and its influence on peace in the European 
Arctic. It was an attempt to provide individual reflections of people involved into processes of 
policy-making and cooperation in the region upon territorial disputes‘ influence on state of 
peace. Research has been based on ten qualitative semi-structured interviews. Concept of 
‗zones of peace‘ has been chosen to explain the connection between territorial issues and 
peaceful co-existence in the region. Three types of zones of peace have been used as 
theoretical framework to analyze reflections upon territory and peace in the European Arctic. 
 
Summary of empirical research findings 
The analysis of field narratives has shown that informants do not consider territorial factor as 
a key element determining peace in the European Arctic.  Even though territorial disputes in 
the region are still considered to be of great importance, they are not perceived as ones 
affecting peace greatly. None of territorial issues existing in contemporary European Arctic 
has been referred to be a serious threat for peace in the study area. Territorial dispute over 
Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone and the shelf area around Svalbard has been described as a 
matter of economic interest and ―geopolitical ambitions‖ rather than a serious threat to peace 
in the region. Problem of delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles, even though being a rather sensitive one, have also been considered to be rather 
unlikely to affect peace in the study area as informants agreed it will be solved according to 
the international law within the time being. Thus, research participants expressed their 
expectations for peaceful dispute settlement in respect to international law, therefore agreeing 
that territorial issues are quite unlikely to affect peace in the European Arctic. Moreover, 
successful border dispute settlement between Russia and Norway has been found to be 
actually a case contributing not only to relations between two countries, but also to peace and 
stability in the European Arctic. 
 
Research findings have also shown that the actual reason why countries put their territorial 
ambitions aside is their desire to benefit from mutual international cooperation. Cooperation 
has been referred to be the main peace-contributing factor in the European Arctic which 
managed to replace territorial confrontation. Moreover different kinds of international 
cooperation have been recognized as driving force for peace-building process in the region 
78 
 
and its benefits have been referred to be of extreme value. States‘ aspiration to seek for 
cooperation instead of confrontation on the regional level in the European Arctic is one of the 
main research findings of this thesis. 
 
Analysis of field narratives has also shown that in terms of international and cross-border 
cooperation research participants prioritize institutions of the Arctic Council and Barents 
Euro-Arctic Region. BEAR has been referred as one of the most effective body for cross-
border collaboration between Northern countries in the European Arctic. Its projects have 
been described as effective, long-going and peace-contributing. Arctic Council, at the same 
time, has been recognized as an important governance body not only for the European Arctic, 
but for the whole Arctic area. However, it has been agreed that the Arctic Council could 
become a more effective institution in terms of peace and governance in contemporary Arctic. 
Informants suggested it should obtain bigger authority in relation to Arctic governance and 
decision-making. Moreover, interviewees suggested Arctic Council transforming into a 
qualitatively new kind of organization comprising functions of common Arctic governance, 
thus making political institutions of Arctic member-states closely interconnected. 
 
Research findings also demonstrate that state of peace in the European Arctic is quite an 
interesting phenomenon. Region has successfully managed to transform from the zone of 
negative peace it used to be in times of Cold War, when relations in the area were 
characterized by mere absence of war due to respect to existing international law, to the zone 
of stable peace characterized by countries staying away from violent conflict resolution with 
closer and more trustful relationships between them. In this case international cooperation, 
once again, served as a driving force for peace-evolution and even territorial 
misunderstandings did not affect the process. Possibility of violent conflict in the region, at 
the same time, has been proven to be miserably small and suggested not to be taken into 
serious account. However, research has proven that due to certain amount of reasons, such as 
lack of political integration and interdependence, and absence of clear common identity; 
European Arctic unfortunately fails to be regarded as pluralistic community of states. 
However, research has identified some premises for regions‘ possible evolution to this kind of 
zone of peace, which are: some kind of historically-shared common mentality, emerging 





This research has sought to bring better understanding the state of peace in the European 
Arctic. It is my hope that this study has contributed to this research area. I have tried to give 
an insight into perceptions of peace in the European Arctic and how peace is influenced by 
territorial issues. My hope is that this study provides a more detailed picture of international 
relations in the area, explains nature of peace there and suggests ways of ensuring region‘s 
peaceful future. My findings demonstrate that territorial ambitions are now replaced by 
aspiration for effective cooperation which contributes to peace and stability in the region. 
Therefore these issues can become the subject of further research. 
 
Suggestions for further research 
As research findings indicate, territory is actually not a key factor determining peace in 
contemporary European Arctic. International connections in the region are more deep and 
complex and territorial ambitions today are replaced by countries‘ desire for cooperation and 
joint Arctic development. Therefore, in my view, further research should be directed towards 
studying different aspects of cooperation and its influence towards peace in the European 
Arctic. Moreover, as current research has emphasized the role of international organizations 
in relation to peace, I recommend studying these issues deeper by taking them as separate 
units of analysis.  
 
Furthermore, study results have shown a certain tendency for European Arctic‘s possible 
future evolution from zone of stable peace to pluralistic community of states. Thus further 
research can also focus on deeper investigation of this process and describing how and why 
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